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SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN1 AND THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE: HOW WIDE HAS THE DOOR TO HUMAN
RIGHTS LITIGATION BEEN LEFT OPEN?
I. INTRODUCTION
Activists are pulling with all their might to open the door to human
rights litigation in the United States federal courts.2 At the same time,
the Bush administration, multinational corporations, and some members
of the Supreme Court are leaning heavily against that door, summoning
the weight of history and tradition to keep it shut.3 This struggle exists
because of the near-dormant state of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)4 since
its enactment as a component of the Judiciary Act of 1789.5 Neither the
Supreme Court nor Congress has made a thorough determination as to
what claims aliens can bring for violation of the “law of nations”6 before
1. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
2. Marcia Coyle, Justices Open Door with Alien Tort Case, THE RECORDER, July 8, 2004, at
1 (remarking that human rights proponents “lost the battle but won the war” with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and would persist with other pending Alien Tort
Statute suits).
3. Warren Richey, When Can Foreigners Sue in US Courts?, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, March 30, 2004, at 2 (reporting that the outcome of the Sosa case is of “great interest to
US-based multinational corporations” that are being increasingly named as defendants in human
rights litigation). The suits brought against these multinational corporations under the ATS “allege
that the companies are aiding and abetting the human rights abuses of the host government.” Id.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). This legislation is known interchangeably as the Alien Tort
Statute, the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Alien Tort Act; throughout this paper it will be
referenced as the Alien Tort Statute, or ATS, as is consistent with the Supreme Court’s language in
Sosa. See infra note 24 for both the modern and historical text of the ATS.
5. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (providing the language of this Act and
explaining its historical context). See also infra notes 39-53 and accompanying text (discussing the
dormant period of the ATS, beginning shortly after its enactment and extending until the Second
Circuit’s decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)).
6. Black’s Law Dictionary cross references “law of nations” to the definition of
“international law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 903 (8th ed. 2004). International law is “[t]he
legal system governing the relationships between nations; more modernly, the law of international
relations, embracing not only nations but also such participants as international organizations,
multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and even individuals (such as those
who invoke their human rights or commit war crimes).” Id. at 835. The author will primarily refer
to this body of law as the “law of nations” rather than “international law” throughout this Note, as it
is the language used in the Alien Tort Statute, see infra note 24, and in the Supreme Court’s
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the federal courts.7
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain8 neither
threw the door open nor shut it firmly.9 Instead, this decision
perpetuates the uncertainty surrounding the ATS by leaving the door
slightly ajar, suggesting that the issue will be revisited frequently as
human rights issues push to the forefront of the national conscience.10
Sosa acknowledges a remedy for violations of the modern day law of
nations without enunciating exactly what that body of law entails.11 The
Court gives hope to human rights activists that the ATS will provide a
jurisdiction for the adjudication of severe international offenses, while
acknowledging that not every international dispute will warrant a cause
of action in the federal courts.12 The Court, cautiously tempering the
ATS to a limited application, staves off a potential influx of alien claims
to the federal court and, at least temporarily, appeases those corporations
who might suffer an adverse effect.13 An analysis of the Court’s
disposition in this case, then, is helpful to gauge the potential outcome of
future human rights litigation and to explore the consequences that
keeping the door ajar to alien claims might invite.14
This Note will explore the Alien Tort Statute from its origin in
1789 to the present interpretation of the Sosa Court.15 Part II will focus
decision in Sosa. Despite the arguably interchangeable use of these terms, “law of nations” is
especially significant to this Note because of the controversy surrounding its meaning and intention.
7. Coyle, supra note 2, at 1. As the “first substantive high court decision on the ATS in the
statute’s history,” Sosa is the Supreme Court’s first attempt to flesh out some of the ambiguous
elements of the ATS. Id. Congress has yet to bring the scope of the ATS up for discussion. GARY
CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE OF 1789, 49 (2003) (encouraging review of the ATS by Congress) [hereinafter HUFBAUER
& MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER]; Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas,
International Implications of the Alien Tort Statute, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 607, 624 (2004)
(suggesting the same) [hereinafter Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, International Implications].
8. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). See supra Section III for the statement of the case.
9. Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, urges that the door be firmly shut. Sosa, 542
U.S. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring). The plurality leaves it open slightly. Id. at 746.
10. See infra notes 90-126 and accompanying text (discussing the plurality’s opinion which
has this result).
11. See infra notes 90-126 and accompanying text (discussing the same).
12. Anthony J. Sebok, Is the Alien Tort Claims Act a Powerful Human Rights Tool?, CABLE
NEWS NETWORK, July 12, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/07/12/sebok.alien.tort.claims/
index.html (last visited March 20, 2006). See infra notes 176-182 and accompanying text
(discussing the connection between the ATS and potential human rights violations and the
controversy surrounding this connection).
13. See infra notes 90-126 and accompanying text (presenting the plurality’s opinion).
14. See infra notes 176-196 and accompanying text (discussing these consequences from
three aspects: human rights activists, multinational corporations, and the foreign policy objectives of
the United States).
15. See infra notes 23-66 and accompanying text (setting forth the history of the ATS).
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on the Framers’ language and intent, discuss the long lull in the use of
the ATS and the impact of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,16 and examine a line
of cases that reawakened the ATS in the 1980s.17 Part III explores the
elements of the Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: the facts
that gave rise to an ATS claim, the plurality’s denial of jurisdiction, its
dicta regarding potential application of the ATS, and Justice Scalia’s
concurring opinion endorsing a very narrow and strict approach to the
modern ATS.18 Part IV analyzes the possible interpretations and
application of the Court’s decision,19 the efforts of human rights victims
and activists to squeeze through the slightly ajar door of the ATS,20 the
potential international and economic implications that may result from
the Supreme Court’s failure to decisively shut the door on ATS
litigation,21 and the role that Congress should play in redefining the
purpose of the ATS.22
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
A. Formation by the First Congress
In 1789, two years after the ratification of the United States
Constitution, the First Congress enacted the Judiciary Act.23 Among the
16. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See infra notes 39-53 and accompanying text (discussing the idle
years of the ATS).
17. See infra notes 54-66 and accompanying text (discussing recent application of the ATS).
18. See infra notes 67-136 and accompanying text (setting forth a summary of the plurality’s
opinion and Justice Scalia’s separate concurring opinion).
19. See infra notes 137-175 and accompanying text (addressing the directions that application
of the Sosa decision could take).
20. See infra notes 176-182 and accompanying text (discussing the same).
21. See infra notes 183-196 and accompanying text (discussing the same).
22. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (discussing the same).
23. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 20
(1789) (available in 1 UNITED STATES STATUTES AT LARGE 73-93 (Richard Peters ed. 1845)
[hereinafter First Congress, Judiciary Act of 1789]). Article III, Section 1 of the United States
Constitution established the Supreme Court and “such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. “The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. From
this meager framework, the First Congress fleshed out the role of the federal judiciary, defining the
structure of the Supreme Court, creating the district and circuit courts, and further refining those
instances in which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. First Congress, Judiciary Act of
1789, supra. See generally Russell G. Donaldson, Construction and Application of Alien Tort
Statute (28 U.S.C.A. § 1350), Providing for Federal Jurisdiction Over Alien’s Action for Tort
Committed in Violation of Law of Nations or Treaty of the United States, 116 A.L.R. FED. 387
(2004) (presenting an exhaustive overview of the Alien Tort Statute and an analysis of those federal
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ways in which this Act expanded the federal judicial powers created in
the Constitution, the Act specifically provided jurisdiction for actions
brought by aliens for torts only.24 Although legislative history is
sparse,25 scholars suspect that Congress included such a provision in the
Judiciary Act to serve economic motives and bolster the United States’
fledgling presence on the international scene.26 The ATS was the
framers’ way of “show[ing] European powers that the new nation would
not tolerate flagrant violations of the ‘law of nations,’ especially when
victims were foreign ambassadors or merchants.”27
court cases which “have construed or applied this statute since its enactment”). Oliver Ellsworth is
credited with authoring the First Judiciary Act. William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the
Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the “Originalists,” 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 222
(1996) [hereinafter Dodge, Historical Origins]. The Judiciary Act has since been codified in Title
28 of the United States Code. See also William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective
Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 495
(1986) (describing the non-controversial passage of the ATS).
24. First Congress, Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 23, at 76-77. The original language of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, Section 9 began: “[t]he district courts shall have, exclusively of the courts
of the States . . .” and then proceeded to specify instances in which the federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction. Id. The clause which would become known as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) read:
“[The district courts] shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or
the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all cases where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” Id. at 77. The modern language of the ATS,
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 states: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). Changes in phraseology were made at various redrafts of
the United States Code to reflect language used in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. at
“Historical and Statutory Notes” (noting the substitution of “civil action” for “suits” consistent with
the FRCP).
25. Casto, supra note 23, at 467 (calling the ATS, its origin and purpose, “obscure”). See also
Richey, supra note 3, at 2 (nicknaming the Sosa case “The Case of the Inscrutable Statute” because
of the difficult task before the Supreme Court justices in interpreting a statute where “virtually no
information exists explaining why Congress passed the [ATS]”).
26. Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 222. See also HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS,
AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 3 (noting U.S. response to “flagrant violations” against
international figures as a precursor to the enactment of the ATS); John Haberstroh, The Alien Tort
Claims Act & Doe v. Unocal: A Paquete Habana Approach to the Rescue, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 231, 236-37 (2004) (calling the ATS an attempt by the “militarily weak [United States] . . . to
gain control over its voice in foreign relations”); Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances:
The Bush Administration’s Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169,
186 (2004) (identifying the crises between the United States and other nations over a series of
“notorious incidents” as the need for the ATS). “[D]espite considerable scholarly attention, it is fair
to say that a consensus of what Congress intended [by the enactment of the ATS] has proven
elusive.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718-19 (2004).
27. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 3. The impetus for
the ATS can be traced to a pair of assaults against foreign dignitaries while in the United States. Id.
See also infra note 28 (describing one of these triggering incidents, involving the French
Ambassador Marbois). The enactment of the ATS shortly following these incidents demonstrated
that even “[e]arly in the history of the republic, Congress was evidently anxious to display
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The inclusion of the ATS in the Judiciary Act reflects the First
Congress’ distrust of the state courts’ ability and willingness to properly
adjudicate aliens’ claims involving the law of nations.28 Having been
entrusted with this duty by the Continental Congress in 1781, the state
courts were left to their own common law interpretations of the law of
nations and with the freedom to punish violations as they saw fit.29 Out
of concern for the United States’ tenuous international status, the First

American leadership in defending international standards of good behavior.” HUFBAUER &
MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 3. William Blackstone “explained that as a
matter of municipal policy, a nation’s domestic law must implement the law of nations in order to
preempt complaints by foreign sovereigns.” Casto, supra note 23, at 489. Economically speaking,
the ATS granted a source of leverage to American merchants doing business internationally.
Haberstroh, supra note 26, at 237. Suppressed by the “belligerent nations” of the mercantile world,
American merchants (and other vulnerable nations) could fight the war for free trade “by means of
moral persuasion.” Id.
28. See Casto, supra note 23, at 495 (surmising that the newly convened Congress “surely
remembered the Continental Congress’ ill-fated law of nations resolution”); Dodge, Historical
Origins, supra note 23, at 234-35 (attributing the passage of the ATS as a means of assuring the law
of nations violations would be resolved “regardless of the vagaries of state law”). State courts had
demonstrated their unwillingness to provide recourse for wronged aliens. Haberstroh, supra note
26, at 239. Among the torts encompassed in the law of nations was the violation of treaties. Id.
See also First Congress, Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 23, at 77 (creating jurisdictions for
violation of the law of nations and treaties); infra note 35 (discussing the widely accepted
understanding of what the “law of nations” encompassed). However, the state courts refused to
grant justice for one such treaty violation by refusing to aid British creditors in recovering debt
promised them in a treaty ending the Revolutionary War. Haberstroh, supra note 26, at 239. The
ATS would ensure that hostile state courts did not put the nation’s security at risk by angering a
recent enemy or hinder the economy by angering a world power. Id.; Casto, supra note 23, at 493
(calling the “possibility that the United States might fail to provide an appropriate sanction or
remedy” to law of nations violations “[t]he real foreign affairs problem”). Even where the states
acted to remedy a violation of the law of nations, the common law which empowered the state
action was not always enough to safeguard the United States against an international predicament.
Haberstroh, supra note 26, at 239. For example, when a French Ambassador, Francis Barbe
Marbois, was threatened in his Philadelphia home by another Frenchman, the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania successfully prosecuted the offender for a violation of the law of nations. Id.; Dodge,
Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 229-30; Casto, supra note 23, at 491-93. The absence of
Pennsylvania common law allowing a corresponding tort claim resulted in a less-than-happy
Ambassador Marbois and “international clamor ensued.” Haberstroh, supra note 26, at 239.
Issuing a resolution was the only remedy the federal government could employ to protect national
security. Sosa, 542 U.S at 717 n.11. The resolution directed an apology to both Marbois and Louis
XVI and an explanation of “‘the difficulties that may arise . . . from the nature of a federal union,’”
as well as a plea “that ‘many allowances are to be made for’ the young nation.” Id. (citing 27 J. OF
THE CONT. CONG. 503).
29. Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 226-27. The nation had, from its very start,
become concerned with the need to “redress individual violations of the law of nations.” Id. at 226.
See also Stephens, supra note 26, at 186 (citing the Continental Congress’ frequent attempts to
encourage the states to punish these violations, both civilly and criminally, prior to the enactment of
the ATS). With this in mind the Continental Congress passed a resolution in 1781 requesting that
the states so litigate such law of nations claims. Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 226.
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Congress enacted the ATS as a definitive statement that an alien’s claim
for a violation of the law of nations could be adjudicated in the federal
courts, rather than being left to the uncertainty and hostility of the state
courts.30 The ATS, while not destroying state common law causes of
action for the law of nations, created a concurrent jurisdiction in the
federal courts,31 thereby assuring aliens – and signaling to world powers
– that violations of the law of nations would be redressed in American
courts.32
The “law of nations,” as the Founding Fathers understood the
notion, can be traced to the teachings of William Blackstone.33
Blackstone theorized that “‘[t]he law of nations is a system of rules,

30. Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 235-36. See also supra notes 27-28
(describing the international status motives behind the enactment of the ATS). The potential for
inconsistencies in the interpretation of the law of nations from state to state was distressing to the
Founding Fathers who sought a consonant interpretation. Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23,
at 235. The authors of the Federalist Papers pointed to the need for federal jurisdiction in this
instance on the bases of national security and a vibrant economy. Id. at 235-36. James Madison
blamed the hostility of state courts to the claims of aliens for the lack of “‘wealthy gentlemen . . .
trading or residing among us.’” Id. at 235 (quoting 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 583 (J. Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1881)).
Alexander Hamilton considered the barring of access to courts for the adjudication of these claims
“‘among the just causes of war’” and therefore felt that “‘the federal judiciary ought to have
cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned.’” Id. at 236
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). In
practice, the resolution of the Continental Congress was ineffective; it appears only one state passed
a law to this effect. Sosa, 542 U.S at 716 (citing FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 82,
83 (J. Cushing ed. 1982) (1784 compilation; exact date of Act unknown)). In theory, however,
“Congress had done what it could to signal a commitment to enforce the law of nations.” Id.
31. See First Congress, Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 23, at 77; 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
32. Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 236. “The new Constitution gave Congress
the authority to do what it could only recommend to the States in 1781.” Id. at 231. See also Curtis
A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights
Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 360 (1997) (identifying the “major impetus” for the ATS as
“unredressed attacks on ambassadors in the United States . . . that implicated the U.S. responsibility
under international law”); Casto, supra note 23, at 481 (explaining that the judicial remedy provided
by the ATS was “necessary in order to assuage the anger of foreign sovereigns”).
33. See Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 225 (recognizing Blackstone’s influence
in early American law). William Blackstone, a British lawyer and contemporary of the Founding
Fathers, lectured on English law at Oxford in the 1750s. Greg Bailey, Blackstone in America,
available at http://earlyamerica.com/review/spring97/blackstone.html (last visited 4/7/2006). The
lectures were later published as Commentaries on the Laws of England. Id. The Framers discovered
their inspiration for the founding documents of the United States in Blackstone’s scientific approach
to the law. Id. But see Casto, supra note 23, at 505 and 505 n.210 (giving credit for the notion of
law of nations to James Wilson, “an influential delegate to the Constitutional Convention”). Wilson
lectured on three branches of the law of nations in 1790 and 1791. Id. He identified “the law of
nations as applied to state” (or the “current international law”), the “law of merchants” (or those
laws which governed “private international business transactions”) and the “law maritime” (which
encompassed admiralty). Id. (internal quotations and footnotes omitted).
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deducible by natural reason, and established by universal consent among
the civilized inhabitants of the world.’”34 Blackstone suggested that
“‘[t]he principle offences against the law of nations . . . are of three
kinds; 1. Violation of safe-conducts; 2. Infringement of the rights of
embassadors [sic]; and 3. Piracy.’”35 An insight to the intentions behind
the ATS can be found in the language of the Continental Congress’
resolution issued to the states as a precursor to the enactment of the
Judiciary Act.36
In words that echo Blackstone, the congressional resolution called
upon state legislatures to “provide expeditious, exemplary, and
adequate punishment” for “the violation of safe conducts or
passports, . . . of hostility against such as are in amity, . . . with the
United States, . . . infractions of the immunities of ambassadors and
other public ministers . . . [and] “infractions of treaties and conventions
to which the United States are a party.”37

Consistent with Blackstone’s influence, the First Congress likely
intended the federal courts would have jurisdiction over these types of
violations by virtue of the ATS.38

34. Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 225-26 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *68).
35. Id. at 226. (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68); Casto, supra note
23, at 490 (crediting Blackstone for establishing these primary violations of the law of nations).
36. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 716 (2004). This resolution dates to 1781, eight
years before the drafting of the ATS. Id. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing
the federal government’s urging of the states to adjudicate aliens’ claims).
37. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716 (citing 21 J. OF THE CONT. CONG. 1136-37 (G. Hunt ed. 1912)).
The Resolution issued by the First Congress to the states also requested that the states “vest their
courts with jurisdiction ‘to decide on offences against the law of nations, not . . . enumerate[d].’”
Casto, supra note 23, at 490 (quoting 21 J. OF THE CONT. CONG. 1137 (1781) (penultimate resolve)).
38. Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 232. Blackstone’s law had already been
absorbed into the common law of the states which the ATS was enacted to centralize. Id.
Violations of safe-conducts would typically involve assaults. Violations of the rights of
ambassadors could involve assault . . . or trespass and false imprisonment. Acts of
piracy could involve assault, trespass, and false imprisonment. Violations of treaties
could implicate a variety of torts, but it is apparent that assaults in violation of U.S.
neutrality could violate a treaty.
Id. at 232-33.
That portion of the general common law known as the law of nations was understood to
refer to the accepted practices of nations in their dealings with one another (treatment of
ambassadors, immunity of foreign sovereigns from suit, etc.) and with actors on the high
seas hostile to all nations and beyond all their territorial jurisdictions (pirates).
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 749 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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B. Nearly 200 Years of Stagnancy
Despite apparently pressing reasons for the inclusion of the Alien
Tort Statute in the Judiciary Act, the jurisdiction it extended for the tort
claims of aliens went essentially unused for nearly 200 years following
its enactment.39 Invoked just over twenty times between 1789 and
1980,40 the federal courts found jurisdiction under the ATS in only two
of those cases.41 During this period, the ATS had effect as “principally a
jurisdictional statute.”42 It was thought that “the ATS confided the
power in federal district courts to hear tort cases brought by foreigners,
but it did not (with limited exceptions) enumerate torts that could be the
basis of a lawsuit.”43
39. Haberstroh, supra note 26, at 236. “The ATS remained largely unnoticed and unused
until 1980.” HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 3. Immediately
following the 1789 passage of the ATS, a handful of events confirmed the need for such legislation.
Casto, supra note 23, at 501. Diplomat-related issues became especially pronounced with the
outbreak of war between France and Great Britain in the early 1790s. Id. President Washington
insisted on the neutrality of Americans toward the hostility, and proclaimed any assistance to either
side a violation of the law of nations. Id. at 502.
40. Haberstroh, supra note 26, at 236; Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, International Implications,
supra note 7, at 609. Two early cases broached the topic of the ATS, but neither relied on the ATS
as the basis for jurisdiction. Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 252. In both cases, the
ATS “was asserted . . . as a supplement to the district courts’ admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”
Id. The 1793 case of Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895), involved the
commandeering of a British ship in U.S. waters by a French privateer. Dodge, Historical Origins,
supra note 23, at 252. The district court dismissed the case on other grounds, but did note
parenthetically that the plaintiff’s claim under the ATS could not be maintained, despite its
foundation in admiralty and maritime law, because it was not a suit for “tort only.” Id. In addition
to damages, the claim also prayed for restitution of the ship. Id.
41. Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, International Implications, supra note 7, at 609. In Bolchos v.
Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D. S.C. 1795) (No. 1607), the ATS served as the reserve jurisdictional basis
for a claim involving another French privateer. Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 253.
In this case the French privateer brought an action for the proceeds of the sale of slaves from a
Spanish vessel he had captured at sea. Id. An agent for the owner of the slaves later recovered the
commandeered slaves and sold them. Id. The district court held that if it “should refuse to take
cognizance of the cause, there would be a failure of justice.” Bolchos, 3 F. Cas. at 810. Jurisdiction
in the federal courts was established in this case because it was an admiralty claim, id., but, the
court also stated:
Besides, as the 9th section of the [J]udiciary [A]ct of [C]ongress gives this court
concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts and circuit court of the United States where
an alien sues for a tort, in violation of the law of nations, or a treaty of the United States,
I dismiss all doubt upon this point.
Id.; Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 22, at 253. In 1961, Adra v. Clift, 195 F.Supp. 857
(D.Md. 1961) successfully found jurisdiction under the ATS. Hufbauer & Mitrokostas,
International Implications, supra note 7, at 609 n.14.
42. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 3.
43. Id. Although many federal courts eventually began expanding the ATS to include a cause
of action for the modern law of nations, most notably in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890
(2d Cir. 1980) (holding that torture violated the law of nations such that the ATS provided
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C. Customary International Law44 and Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins45
When the First Congress enacted the ATS in 1789, the law of
nations existed as part of the general common law.46 One-hundred-fiftyyears later, in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,47 the Supreme Court struck down
the concept of federal common law and required that federal courts use
the law of the state in which they are situated.48 In theory, the decision
in Erie should have had a significant impact on the ATS; the law of
nations, as understood by the drafters of the ATS, was embodied in
general common law.49 Likewise, any modern causes of action that the
jurisdiction for an alien’s claim against another alien), see supra notes 54-66 (focusing on the
Filartiga decision and related issues), some courts held true to the idea that the ATS did nothing
more than “provid[e] a forum, but not a cause of action, for aliens suing in tort.” Patrick D. Curran,
Universalism, Relativism, and Private Enforcement of Customary International Law, 5 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 311, 313-14, 314 n.12 (2004). The supporters of this view would likely embrace the
interpretation of the ATS as advanced by Judge Robert H. Bork in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (U.S. App. D.C. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). Judge Bork
adhered to a very strict “originalist” interpretation of the ATS. Dodge, Historical Origins, supra
note 23, at 237. Judge Bork’s decision, then, is in opposition to the Filartiga decision, on the basis
of three principles: “(1) that an express cause of action is needed, which the Clause does not
provide; (2) that the Clause should be limited to those torts that violated the law of nations in 1789;
and (3) that the Clause should be limited to prize cases.” Id.
44. Customary international law “is one of the principal sources or building blocks of the
international legal system.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 835 (8th ed. 2004). It is “[i]nternational
law that derives from the practice of states and is accepted by them as legally binding.” Id.
45. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
46. Leading Case: B. Alien Tort Statute, 118 HARV. L. REV. 446, 451 (2004) [hereinafter
Leading Case]. The general common law was a “brooding omnipresence recognized rather than
created by federal and state judges alike.” Id. (internal quotation and footnote omitted). The more
formal definition of general federal common law is:
[T]he judge-made law developed by federal courts in diversity-of-citizenship cases.
Since Erie, a federal court has been bound to apply the substantive law of the state in
which it sits. So even though there is a ‘federal common law,’ there is no longer a
general common law applicable to all disputes heard in federal court.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 293 (8th ed. 2004).
47. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that there is no federal common law).
48. See generally Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1278-85 (1996) (giving an overview of the Erie decision and its general
denial of federal common law). There are companion opinions that allow federal common law
creation when it is “defined by express congressional authorization to devise a body of law
directly.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726 (citing Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448
(1957)). See also Paul L. Hoffman & Daniel A. Zaheer, The Rules of the Road: Federal Common
Law and Aiding and Abetting Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 47, 60 (2003) (discussing a caveat to federal common law-making as exemplified in the
Lincoln Mills case). See infra notes 150-165 and accompanying text (debating the intent of the ATS
to authorize substantive lawmaking).
49. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 331-32 (stating the position that there is “little
doubt” that prior to the Erie decision, customary international law “had the status of general
common law, not federal law”); see also Clark, supra note 48, at 1280-81 (noting the direct effect of
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law of nations concept of the ATS could potentially accommodate would
exist in customary international law, akin to the federal common law of
the pre-Erie courts.50 Customary international law, which “results from
a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense
of legal obligation,”51 becomes part of the federal common law52 if it
becomes part of U.S. law at all.53

Erie on the law of nations); see generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of Customary International
Law in U.S. Courts - Before and After Erie, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 807, 810 (1998)
(analyzing the effect of the Erie decision on the use of customary international law by federal
courts); Hoffman & Zaheer, supra note 48, at 55-59 (offering a discussion of Erie’s impact on
customary international law’s place in U.S. courts). But see Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and
Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith,
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 374-76 (1997) (refuting Bradley and Goldsmith’s contention that
customary international law is embodied in federal common law and therefore destroyed with the
Erie decision). “The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized disputes implicating foreign
relations as one of the areas where the creation of federal common law is justified by an overriding
federal interest.” Id. at 377.
50. See infra notes 90-136 and accompanying text for the Supreme Court’s debate on the
modern law of nations; see infra section IV for the author’s analysis of the inclusion of customary
international law in the reach of the ATS.
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §102 (1987).
See generally William J. Aceves, The Legality of Transborder Abductions: A Study of United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 3 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 101, 138 (1996) (identifying the sources of
customary international law as “numerous and includ[ing]: state practice; international legal
decisions; treaties and other international legal instruments; the practice of international
organizations; national legislation and national legal decisions”).
52. C.f. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding “[i]nternational law is part of
our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination”); see also Donald J. Kochan, The Political Economy of the Production of Customary
International Law: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in U.S. Courts, 22 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 240, 250 (2004) (recognizing The Paquete Habana case as the controlling authority
allowing international law to be applied in U.S. courts even when the international law has not been
ratified as a treaty or similarly given status as a federal law).
53. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 358 (supporting the view that customary
international law should not be treated as substantive federal law). But see T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Customary
International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 91, 91 (2004) (arguing a novel viewpoint that
customary international law “has always – and properly – been viewed as . . . neither federal nor
state law but, rather, law to be applied in appropriate cases by federal courts in instances where they
otherwise possess jurisdiction.”).
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D. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala54 Resurrects the Alien Tort Statute55
In 1980, the Second Circuit revived the ATS both as a jurisdictional
basis and as creating a cause of action for a violation of the law of
nations.56 The Filartiga decision gave life to the ATS in a way that
many argue the Framers never intended.57 It was clear that the statute
gave the federal courts jurisdiction over alien tort claims,58 but up to this
point it was unclear whether the statute also had an embedded cause of
action.59 Filartiga and the line of cases that followed it60 argued that
54. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). In 1976, Americo Noberto Pena-Irala (Pena), the Inspector
General of the Police in Asuncion, Paraguay, allegedly kidnapped, tortured and killed a Paraguayan
youth, Joelito Filartiga, and displayed his corpse to his sister. Id. at 878. The Filartiga family was a
pronounced opponent of the presidency of Alfredo Stroessner, who had controlled Paraguay since
1954. Id. While criminal actions were proceeding slowly in Paraguay, happenstance brought both
the alleged offender, Pena, and the sister of the victim, Dolly Filartiga, to reside in the United
States. Id. Dolly settled in Washington, D.C., and had applied for permanent political asylum after
entering the United States on a visitor’s visas in 1978. Id. Pena and his companion also entered the
United States on visitor’s visas in 1978 and moved to Brooklyn, New York. Id. After learning that
Pena had entered the United States, Dolly notified Immigration and Naturalization Service (who
subsequently arrested Pena and ordered his deportation) and commenced an action in the Eastern
District of New York for the wrongful death of her brother. Id. at 879.
55. Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Nicholas K. Mitrokostas use more colorful language to refer to
the ATS in the title of their work, Awakening Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789, supra note 7.
The economic impact that certain interpretations of the ATS – when it is invoked to sue
multinational corporations – may warrant such a moniker for the ATS. Id. at 1. See infra notes
183-89 and accompanying text (analyzing the consequences of liberal ATS litigation for
multinational corporations).
56. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890. The Second Circuit determined both that torture violated
customary international law and that the law of nations of the ATS included this customary law. Id.
at 883. Regarding torture, the court declared they “have little difficulty discerning its universal
renunciation in the modern usage and practice of nations.” Id. The court proceeded to incorporate
this customary international law into the “law of nations” language of the ATS. Id. at 884. “Having
examined the sources from which customary international law is derived [–] the usage of nations,
judicial opinions and the works of jurists [–] we conclude that official torture is now prohibited by
the law of nations.” Id. The court thus reversed the lower court’s finding that the federal courts had
no jurisdiction over the aliens’ claim. Id. at 890.
57. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 4. The Second
Circuit lent an interpretation to the ATS that updated the language from “law of nations” to
“international law.” See id. at 3-4.
58. See supra note 24 (reciting the original language of the ATS and its modern counterpart).
But see Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885-87 (undertaking an analysis of whether Article III of the U.S.
Constitution makes the First Congress’ authorization of jurisdiction over alien tort claims
unconstitutional, and concluding that the ATS was an appropriate exercise of Congress’ ability to
legislate the jurisdiction of federal courts).
59. Stephens, supra note 26, at 186. One school of thought is that the Framers understood the
ATS to authorize a cause of action without requiring further legislation by Congress. Id. See also
supra notes 39-43 (discussing the lack of attention given to the ATS by Congress and the courts and
the corresponding lack of analysis of the cause of action issue); supra note 25 (discussing the lack
of legislative history surrounding the ATS and reliance on contemporaneous events to determine the
meaning of the ATS).
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unless the ATS intended to authorize a cause of action for the law of
nations, this clause of the Judiciary Act would have been pointless and
powerless.61 The Filartiga decision resolved that the law of nations as
contemplated during the United States’ formative years would translate
to the human rights violations of today.62 “This is undeniably an action
by an alien, for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations.”63 Filartiga established a precedent in federal courts that “the
ATS . . . enables foreigners to sue in U.S. courts for all torts committed
in violation of international law, as international law may be
contemporaneously interpreted.”64 Following the Filartiga decision,
“ATS litigation has proliferated in federal courts, embroiling U.S. courts
in a broad array of international controversies and incidents ranging
from alleged war crimes to terrorist attacks to environmental abuses.”65
60. A representative sampling of the federal court cases which followed the reasoning of
Filartiga finding in favor of ATS jurisdiction includes: Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir.
1995) (holding that the federal court had jurisdiction over claims of the alien plaintiffs against the
defendant-Bosnian-Serb self-proclaimed leader “for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity in his private capacity”), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996), aff’d sub nom. Doe v.
Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1997); De Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699,
723 (9th Cir. 1992) (allowing aliens’ ATS claim for “anti-Semitic, government-sponsored tyranny”
and torture to go forward by virtue of a waiver of sovereign immunity), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017
(1993); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that two Argentinians’
claims of torture, murder and prolonged arbitrary detention against an Argentinian general
amounted to a cause of action under the ATS); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass.
1995) (holding Guatemalan citizens’ allegations of torture, arbitrary detentions, summary
executions, and disappearances were sufficient to sustain jurisdiction under the ATS); Abebe-Jira v.
Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the claims of “torture and cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment” of Ethiopian citizens against officials in the controlling dictatorship of
Ethiopia were actionable under the ATS), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 830 (1996); Jama v. U.S. I.N.S., 22
F. Supp. 2d 353 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding that the poor and inhuman treatment given to alien asylumseekers was actionable under the ATS). See also generally Donaldson, supra note 23 (“collect[ing]
and analyz[ing] the federal court cases which have construed or applied [the ATS] since its
enactment.”).
61. Stephens, supra note 26, at 187-88. An interpretation of the ATS that requires additional
legislation for the individual claim of an alien, Stephens argues, is “ahistorical” because it would
mean “that Congress intended that the [ATS] create a category of jurisdiction that would remain
empty until filled with legislatively enacted claims.” Id. at 187.
62. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER supra note 7, at 3-4. “The core
holding of Filartiga has been followed by courts around the country: an alien may sue for violations
of ‘universal, definable and obligatory’ international law norms.” Stephens, supra note 26, at 174.
63. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887. In the time between the Filartiga decision and the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Sosa, there has been “a near-unanimous consensus among federal courts” requiring
that an alien’s tort claim “involve[ ] a violation of the ‘law of nations,’” which is referred to as
customary international law in modern terms. Hoffman & Zaheer, supra note 48, at 50.
64. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 4 (emphasis in
original).
65. Gregory G. Garre, Coded Message, THE RECORDER, September 17, 2004, at 4 (explaining
that Filartiga retrieved the ATS from “historical obscurity” and spawned numerous other ATS
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It would not be until Sosa that any discussion by the Supreme Court
addressed this interpretation of the statute by the federal courts.66
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of the Facts
In 1990, a federal grand jury indicted Humberto Alvarez-Machain
(Alvarez), a Mexican physician, for the murder of Enrique CamarenaSalazar, an agent of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).67 The
United States District Court for the Central District of California issued
a warrant for Alvarez’s arrest following the grand jury’s indictment, and
the DEA sought the Mexican government’s help in bringing him to the
United States.68 Because the Mexican government was either unwilling
or unable to comply with the DEA’s request for Alvarez’s delivery, the
DEA hired Mexican nationals to kidnap Alvarez and bring him to the
United States where the DEA would have authority to arrest and try
Alvarez.69 Among those the DEA engaged to seize Alvarez was the
petitioner, Jose Francisco Sosa.70 In a DEA-approved action, Mexican
nationals “abducted Alvarez from his house, held him overnight in a
motel, and brought him by private plane to El Paso, Texas, where he was
arrested by federal officers.”71
After being acquitted of his criminal charges by the District Court
in 1993,72 Alvarez returned to Mexico and commenced a civil action in
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California for damages

claims in the federal courts over the next twenty years). See also supra note 60 (detailing decisions
following Filartiga).
66. Garre, supra note 65, at 4. The Sosa case “signals a new era in the Rip van Winkle life of
the ATS.” Id.
67. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697 (2004). Alvarez had allegedly been involved in CamarenaSalazar’s 1985 torture and death in Guadalajara Mexico. Id. (citing United States v. AlvarezMachain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992)). The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) gathered eyewitness
testimony which led officials to believe that Alvarez was present at the place where CamarenaSalazar was killed, and that Alvarez had “acted to prolong the agent’s life in order to extend the
interrogation and torture.” Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 698.
71. Id.
72. Id. Citing the outrageous nature of his arrest, Sosa moved to dismiss his indictment with a
claim that the method of his arrest violated the extradition treaty between the United States and
Mexico. Id. The District Court dismissed the criminal case, which the Ninth Circuit upheld. Id.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Id. In 1992, Alvarez was acquitted. Id.
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suffered during his alleged false arrest.73 Alvarez asserted a claim for
damages against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA),74 and a claim against Sosa for a violation of the law of nations,
invoking the Alien Tort Statute.75 The FTCA allows a suit against the
Government for the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of its
employees.76 As an alien, Alvarez argued for both jurisdiction and a
cause of action under the ATS for his claim against Sosa, also a Mexican
national, alleging the nature of his arrest was a violation of the law of
nations.77
B. Procedural History
Holding that Alvarez’s apprehension in Mexico, including the state
sponsored transborder abduction and the arbitrary detention, violated
customary international law, the district court entered summary
judgment against Sosa under the ATS.78 Both Alvarez and Sosa
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.79 First, a three-judge panel, and then the
court sitting en banc affirmed the judgment and damages awarded on the
73. Id. Alvarez named the following defendants in this suit: Sosa, Antonio Garate-Bustament
(both a DEA agent and a Mexican national), five unnamed Mexican nationals, the United States,
and four DEA agents. Id.
74. Id. The relevant portion of the FTCA provides:
[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000).
75. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698. See 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2000); supra notes 24-66 and accompanying
text (detailing the specific language of the ATS and its evolution over the 200-plus years of its
existence).
76. See supra note 73 (detailing the liability of the Federal Government under the FTCA).
There are numerous instances in which the government is exempt from such liability. See infra
notes 87-88 (discussing the exceptions relevant to the Government’s liability in this case).
77. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698; see also supra notes 24-66 for the text of the ATS and a discussion
of the evolution of this statute.
78. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 610-11 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 542 U.S.
692 (2004). The district court limited Alvarez’s recovery to only the damages he suffered while
detained in Mexico. Id. at 611. Alvarez’s award totaled $25,000, calculated by federal common law
as opposed to Mexican law. Id.
79. Id. Sosa argued that Alvarez should not have been permitted a cause of action under the
ATS, and that the district court erred in not applying Mexican law for the award of damages. Id.
Alvarez appealed two issues irrelevant to Supreme Court’s decision: 1) the United States should not
have replaced the DEA agents against whom he also had ATS claims, and 2) his damages should
not have been limited to his Mexican arrest. Id.
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ATS claims.80 Under Ninth Circuit precedent,81 the court held that
Alvarez had a cause of action under the ATS.82 The Ninth Circuit
interpreted the ATS as not only establishing jurisdiction in federal courts
for the tort claims of aliens, but also establishing “a cause of action for
an alleged violation of the law of nations.”83 The Ninth Circuit further
applied the requirement that the law of nations be “specific, universal,
and obligatory” in nature broadly enough to encompass Alvarez’s
arbitrary arrest and detention claims.84 The United States and Sosa
appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, arguing that the ATS does nothing
more than establish jurisdiction in the federal courts.85
The district court, on the government’s motion, dismissed Alvarez’s
FTCA claims.86 After a series of appeals and remands,87 the Ninth
Circuit ultimately reversed the dismissal of the FTCA claims.88 The
80. Id. at 611.
81. See Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that “acts of official
torture violate customary international law,” and concluding that the plaintiff, an alien, had
“properly invoke[d] the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts under the [ATS]” in a
wrongful death action against Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos and his daughter for the
torture and murder of a Philippine citizen); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that the ATS not only establishes jurisdiction in the federal courts, but also creates a cause
of action for the violation of the law of nations).
82. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 612.
83. Id. See also infra notes 150-165 and accompanying text (discussing the discretion federal
courts use to determine these causes of action).
84. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 619. The Ninth Circuit comments that the “specific,
universal, and obligatory” test for law of nations violations is necessary to limit judicial review of
international law to only those “that have achieved sufficient consensus to merit application by a
domestic tribunal.” Id. at 612. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964),
superseded by The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 620(e)(2), 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370(e)(2). While
arbitrary arrest and detention meet this threshold, Alvarez’s claim of transborder abduction does not
rise to this level according to the Ninth Circuit. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 620; see also infra
notes 137-149 (discussing the standard proposed by the Supreme Court for the determination of
international law use in federal courts).
85. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 699 (2004).
86. Id.
87. Alvarez’s FTCA claims had a tumultuous journey through the district and circuit courts.
Alvarez’s initial complaint was comprised of both conventional (kidnapping, torture, cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detention, assault and battery, false imprisonment,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, false arrest, negligent employment, and negligent
infliction of emotional distress) and constitutional torts (under the Fourth, Fifth and Eight
Amendments for kidnapping, torture, cruel and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment,
denial of adequate medical treatment, and arbitrary detention). Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 610.
All of the DEA agents were replaced by the United States as defendant as to the conventional tort
claims. Id. The District Court denied the United States’ defense that the FTCA claims were timebarred, which the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. On remand, the United States was granted summary
judgment on all of the FTCA claims. Id. at 611. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal
of the FTCA claims. Id.
88. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 699. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) restores sovereign immunity where the
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government included an appeal of the FTCA ruling with its request for
review of the ATS interpretation.89
C. Supreme Court’s Decision
1. Plurality
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit.90 The Court
overturned the finding of government liability under the FTCA for the
arrest of Alvarez-Machain in Mexico, holding that “the foreign country
exception [of the FTCA] bars all claims based on any injury suffered in
a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission
occurred.”91
Government would otherwise be liable under § 1346(b), for those claims “arising in a foreign
country.” 28 U.S.C. §2680(k) (2000). The court held that despite the language of the statute, the
Government was still liable under the “headquarters doctrine,” which allows a claim to proceed “if
harm occurring in a foreign country was proximately caused by acts in the United States.” AlvarezMachain, 331 F.3d at 638. According to the Circuit Court, the “quintessential headquarters claim”
is one in which government employees, from the locale of their U.S. offices, “guide and supervise
actions in other countries.” Id. Because the DEA, from its office in Los Angeles, had coordinated
the removal of Alvarez, giving “precise instructions” regarding who should be involved and how
Alvarez should be handled, the court maintained the United States liability, stating that “Alvarez’s
abduction fits the headquarters doctrine like a glove.” Id.
89. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 699. The Ninth Circuit had also explored a possible exception under the
FTCA for intentional torts, as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 639.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that Alvarez’s claim was not excluded by the
intentional torts exception because the DEA agents are law enforcement officers within the scope of
the FTCA. Id. The government did not appeal on this basis and the Supreme Court does not
address it in its opinion. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 699. The Government also appealed the FTCA claim on
the basis that the arrest was not tortious. Id. The Government argued that 21 U.S.C. § 878 grants
arrest authority to the DEA. Id. The Supreme Court did not decide the FTCA issue on that ground.
Id.
90. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the court. Id. at 697.
Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas) filed a separate concurring
opinion as to the issue of the ATS. Id. at 739. Justice Ginsburg filed a separate concurring opinion
as to FTCA element of the decision (joined by Justice Breyer). Id. at 751. Justice Breyer filed his
own concurring opinion. Id. at 760.
91. Id. at 712. The full extent of the Supreme Court’s decision regarding the FTCA claim
will not be discussed in this Note, as the author’s focus is on Alvarez’s claims under the ATS.
However, a brief consideration of the Court’s holding will be helpful as it is likely the Government
will use the shield of the FTCA foreign country exception in the eventuality that a claim is
permitted under the ATS and the United States is named as a defendant. See David C. Baluarte,
Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: Upholding the Alien Tort Claims Act While Affirming
American Exceptionalism, 12 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 11, 13 (2004) (noting that the FTCA will protect the
United States government from exposure to liability under the ATS).
The Court refused to apply the headquarters doctrine to this case, lest it “swallow the
foreign country exception whole.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 703. Employing a test of proximate causation,
the Court examined the actions of the DEA agents in the United States, and determined that even if
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The circuit court’s ATS holding – recognizing transborder arrest as
a violation of the law of nations and an actionable tort under the ATS –
led the Supreme Court to delve into the obscure background of the
ATS.92 Using the available historical framework of the ATS, the
plurality arrived at two conclusions concerning Congress’s original
intentions for the ATS.93 Justice Souter reasoned that history supports
the proposition that the ATS was intended to be a functional statute,
which in turn meant the ATS must include some latent cause of action,
in addition to the jurisdictional grant.94
[T]here is every reason to suppose that the First Congress did not pass
the ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for
use by a future Congress or state legislature that might, some day,
authorize the creation of causes of action or itself decide to make some
element of the law of nations actionable for the benefit of foreigners.95

Beyond the jurisdictional provisions of the ATS, the Court
concluded that history implies “that Congress intended the ATS to
furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of actions alleging

the plans made in Los Angeles and Washington were a proximate cause of Alvarez’s injuries, they
did not subsume the proximate causation of the action that occurred in Mexico. Id. at 703-04. The
Court also focused on the “arising in” language of 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (k) to mean an exclusion of all
claims for injuries which occur in a foreign country. Id. at 704-05. Most importantly, the Court
cautioned that the foreign country exception was in place to protect the United States against claims
where the substantive law of foreign countries must apply, and the headquarters doctrine would
undo this safeguard. Id. at 705-06.
Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion (joined by Justice Breyer) with regard to the
FTCA claim. Id. at 751 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). In Justice Ginsburg’s view, the “arising in”
language of the foreign country exception does not point to the place where the harm occurred, but
to the place of the act or omission. Id. at 760. The “last significant act or omission rule” determines
where the claim “arises.” Id. With this in mind, Justice Ginsburg found the Government to be free
from liability, because the actions in Mexico were the last significant act causing Alvarez’s harm.
Id.
92. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712-13. To begin his discussion of the ATS and its applicability to the
Sosa case, Justice Souter employed the literary moniker given to the ATS by Judge Friendly to
remark that few indicators of the original framers’ intent accompany the “legal Lohengrin.” Id. at
718-19. The Court entered this murky area of the law aware of this fact: “despite considerable
scholarly attention, it is fair to say that a consensus understanding of what Congress intended has
proven elusive.” Id.; see supra note 25 (discussing the legislative obscurity of the ATS).
93. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719. The Court examined many of the same historic texts and scholarly
analyses of the First Congressional era that are examined supra, notes 23-38.
94. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719.
95. Id. Justice Souter cites the “anxieties of the preconstitutional period,” see supra notes 2538 and accompanying text (sketching the same historical atmosphere which Justice Souter relies on
here), as evidence that the statute was meant to have “practical effect.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719.
“There is too much historical record to believe that Congress would have enacted the ATS only to
leave it lying fallow indefinitely.” Id.
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violations of the law of nations.”96 It is these inferred causes of action
that gave the ATS its limited practical effect.97 “The jurisdictional grant
is best read as having been enacted on the understanding that the
common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of
international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the
time.”98
The Court, however, could not infer from the ATS’s history that the
concept of the law of nations was meant to be an expanding one.99
Justice Souter “found no basis to suspect that Congress had any
examples in mind beyond those corresponding to Blackstone’s three
primary offenses: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights
of ambassadors, and piracy.”100 The plurality reasoned that the Court
must be cautious in allowing alien tort claims to fall within the “law of
nations” umbrella of the ATS.101 They declined to accept the
interpretation advanced by Alvarez – that the ATS was not only
jurisdictional, but also a cause of action for wide-sweeping violations of
modern international law – deeming such an interpretation
“implausible.”102 However, they also declined to adopt the interpretation
that Sosa proposed.103 Sosa’s view – that “there could be no relief
96. Id. at 720. The Continental Congress’ grappling with its inability to punish infractions of
the law of nations is the basis for Justice Souter’s inference that at least some meager meat was
stuck to the bones of the ATS. Id. at 716 (citing J. Madison, JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 60 (E. Scott ed. 1893)). See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text for discussion
of the Continental Congress’ early attempts to enforce the law of nations.
97. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. “[T]he reasonable inference from the historical materials is that the
statute was intended to have practical effect the moment it became law.” Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 725. “[S]ome, but few, torts in violation of the law of nations were understood to be
within the common law.” Id. at 720.
100. Id. at 724. The First Congress’ intention likely was shaped by Blackstone’s theory of the
law of nations. Id. See supra notes 33-38 for a discussion of Blackstone’s influence on the
Founding Fathers.
101. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. Justice Souter outlined five reasons for the Court’s caution: 1) the
changed concept of common law since 1789; 2) the “rethinking of the role of the federal courts in
making [common law]” (citing the Court’s decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 65 (1938)
(denying the existence of federal common law), see supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Erie’s impact on the ATS; 3) the Court’s insistence that private rights of action are
better created by the legislature; 4) the potential impact on the foreign relations of the United States;
and 5) the lack of a congressional mandate to “seek out and define new and debatable violations of
the law of nations.” Id. at 725-28. See also infra note 198 (arguing that Justice Souter’s five
concerns should be an incentive for Congress to legislate the ATS claims that can be actionable in
U.S. courts).
102. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713. When the ATS authorized “cognizance” over the law of nations to
the district courts, “the term bespoke a grant of jurisdiction, not power to mold substantive law.” Id.
103. Id. “[H]istory and practice give the edge” to the position that “because torts in violation
of the law of nations would have been recognized within the common law of the time,” the ATS

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss2/7

18

D'Amore: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
DAMORE1.DOC

2006]

4/14/2006 1:15:04 PM

SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN

611

without a further statute expressly authorizing adoption of causes of
action” – would, in the Court’s opinion, render the ATS “stillborn.”104
The Court settled that “the statute was intended as jurisdictional in the
sense of addressing the power of the courts to entertain cases concerned
within a certain subject.”105
The conclusion that a confined set of causes of action accompanied
the ATS would direct the court to analyze those cases that have the good
fortune of being actionable under the ATS.106 The Court began by
examining the law of nations at the time of enactment of the ATS,107 and
then referenced an historical text which treated the law of nations as
“general norms governing the behavior of national states with each
other.”108 Despite strong authority tending to limit the law of nations to
application between states, the Supreme Court adopted Blackstone’s
teachings and recognized limited situations in which the law of nations
protects individual rights.109 The Court determined that the intent of the
Judiciary Act was that the ATS’s jurisdictional strength be supplemented
by causes of action which could arise under the common law.110
According to the Court’s interpretation of the ATS, the common law

was not a moot statute because of the lack of additional legislation to attach causes of action. Id.
104. Id. at 714. “[T]here is every reason to suppose that the First Congress did not pass the
ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf.” Id. at 719. The Court found “it
would have been passing strange” to hold that “Congress would have enacted the ATS only to leave
it lying fallow indefinitely.” Id. Instead the Court summons what is available in the historical
record to breathe life to the drafters’ intentions. Id. at 720. See infra notes 119-20 and
accompanying text (citing the Supreme Court’s insistence that the ATS was meant to have a
functional value immediately following its passage, thus requiring an interpretation that some
causes of action were contained within the law of nations concept).
105. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714. These cases were limited to a “modest set of actions alleging
violations of the law of nations.” Id. at 720.
106. Id.
107. Id. For example, Blackstone formed a broad basis for this understanding. Id. See supra
notes 33-38 and accompanying text for the impact of Blackstone’s writings on the drafters.
108. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714. The law of nations was “‘the science which teaches the rights
subsisting between nations or states, and the obligations correspondent to those nations.’” Id.
(quoting E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, PRELIMINARIES § 3 (J. Chitty et al. trans. ed.
1883)).
109. Id. at 720. Traditionally the offenses encompassed in the law of nations were only those
that affected “‘whole states or nations’ and not individuals seeking relief in courts.” Id. The Court
looked again to Blackstone to identify this class of potential plaintiffs under a law of nations claim
and to exclude individuals from the traditional understanding. Id. However, the Court did not
unilaterally preclude an individual’s use of the ATS and law of nations claims. Id.
110. Id. at 724. The “reasonable inference” was that the framers were relying on the common
law to provide a cause of action “for the modest number of international law violations with a
potential for personal liability at the time.” Id. The Court reaches this conclusion because of its
belief that “the statute was intended to have practical effect the moment it became law.” Id.
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also encompassed claims of individual aliens.111 The Court could point
to no occurrence in the two centuries since the enactment of the ATS
that “categorically precluded the federal courts from recognizing a claim
under the law of nations as an element of common law.”112 To limit the
scope of the claims that could be brought under the jurisdiction of the
ATS, the Court relied on the “present-day law of nations,” and adopted a
standard that required the claims to “rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have
recognized.”113
The Court declined to completely cease “judicial recognition of
actionable international norms;”114 instead, “the door is still ajar subject
to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international
norms today.”115 Relying on the precedent of The Paquete Habana116
and rejecting complete occlusion by Erie,117 the plurality recognized that
certain claims could meet their standard.118 The Court preserved an
111. Id. The Court reaches this conclusion despite the absence of a “basis to suspect” that
Congress had any specific claims in mind beyond those which would have been comprehended
from Blackstone’s teachings: “violation of safe conducts, infringements of the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy.” Id. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text for the background of
Blackstone’s influence on the Framers.
112. Sosa, 542 U.S. 724-25. Justice Scalia argued that the plurality misunderstood Erie’s
effect on the existence of a general federal common law. Id. at 744-45 (Scalia, J., concurring). See
infra notes 127-36 and accompanying text for Justice Scalia’s position. See also supra notes 44-53
for background of the Erie decision and its effect on the general common law.
113. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. See infra notes 141-49 and accompanying text (analyzing the
application of this “international character” standard in federal courts).
114. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
115. Id. See infra note 118 (addressing some of the international norms which the Court
accepted as actionable under the ATS).
116. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding that “[i]nternational law is part of our law and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination”). See supra note 52
(discussing The Paquete Habana precedent permitting international law in U.S. courts).
117. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729 (“Erie did not in terms bar any judicial recognition of new
substantive rules, no matter what the circumstances, and post-Erie understanding has identified
limited enclaves in which federal courts may derive some substantive law in a common law way.”).
The common law, according to the Court, is not “a discoverable reflection of universal reason.” Id.
The Court instead described common law in a “positivistic way, as a product of human choice.” Id.
118. Id. at 730-31. The Court accepts that some modern violations fit within the historic
concept of the law of nations, such as in Filartiga, in which the district court drew a parallel
between torturers and pirates, to couch a cause of action for torture into the ATS-enactment era law
of nations. Id. at 732. “‘[F]or the purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become – like the
pirate and the slave trader before him – hostis humani generic, an enemy of all mankind.’” Id.
(quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)). The Tel-Oren court, which
rejected ATS jurisdiction for the claim before the court, see supra note 43 (briefly reciting the
court’s holding in this case), also espoused a limitation on the ATS agreeable to the Sosa court. Id.
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opportunity for the federal courts to apply international law via the
common law; to decide otherwise, even given the decision in Erie,
“would take some explaining to say now that the federal courts must
avert their gaze entirely from any international norm intended to protect
individuals.”119 Justice Souter argued that it was preposterous to think
the Framers would have anticipated the death of the common law or that
they would have allowed this modern shift to incapacitate the federal
courts when it came to upholding international law.120
The Court, therefore, looked to “historical antecedents” to
determine if Alvarez’s claim might pass through the door.121 The Court
determined that Alvarez’s claim for arbitrary arrest and detention did not
violate any norm of international law, such that it could support a cause
of action under the ATS.122 “We do not believe . . . that the limited,
implicit sanction to entertain the handful of international cum common
law claims understood in 1789 should be taken as authority to recognize

That court suggested “the ‘limits of [the ATS]’s reach’ be defined by ‘a handful of heinous actions –
each of which violates definable, universal and obligatory norms.’” Id. (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (U.S. App. D.C. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1003 (1985)).
119. Id. at 730. “[O]ur holding today is consistent with the division of responsibilities between
federal and state courts after Erie.” Id. at 731 n.19.
120. Id. at 730. Justice Souter wrote, “We think it would be unreasonable to assume that the
First Congress would have expected federal courts to lose all capacity to recognize enforceable
international norms simply because the common law might lose some metaphysical cachet on the
road to modern realism.” Id.
121. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. The Court quotes The Paquete Habana decision at length because
it fully articulates the authority on which the courts can cull customary international law for
application in their own courts. Id.at 733-34. The Paquete Habana instructs:
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and as
evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor,
research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the
subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy
evidence of what the law really is.
Id. at 734 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
122. Id. at 738. The Court rejected Alvarez’s arguments that arbitrary arrest and detention is in
fact a violation of an international law norm. Id. at 735-38. Alvarez cited the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the Court held
did not “create obligations enforceable in federal courts” and which could not be used by Alvarez to
establish an applicable rule of international law. Id. at 735. The Court also rejected Alvarez’s
argument that arbitrary detention is generally prohibited; the Court reasoned that if such an
argument were accepted, “[h]is rule would support a cause of action in federal court for any arrest,
anywhere in the world, unauthorized by the law of the jurisdiction in which it took place, and would
create a cause of action for any seizure of any alien in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at
736.
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the right of action asserted by Alvarez here.”123
The standard adopted by the Court – based on “historical
antecedents” – leaves a certain amount of discretion to the lower
courts.124 The Court conditioned this discretion on an awareness of the
ramifications of recognizing actionable violations of international law.125
“[T]he determination whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a
cause of action should (and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an element
of judgment about the practical consequences of making that cause
available to litigants in the federal courts.”126
2. Justice Scalia’s Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia, joined by former Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, filed a concurring opinion to stress his opposition to the
plurality’s “reservation of a discretionary power in the Federal Judiciary
to create causes of action for the enforcement of international-law-based
norms.”127 Justice Scalia agreed with the plurality’s ATS analysis with
respect to its determination that the statute is jurisdictional only and that
the ATS at most authorizes causes of actions under the law of nations
purely as understood by the 1789 drafters.128 Justice Scalia departed
from the plurality, however, in insisting the Court find a case or statute
that “authorizes that peculiar exception from Erie’s fundamental holding
123. Id. at 712. Alvarez attempted to bolster his argument that arbitrary arrest and transborder
abduction amounted to a violation of the law of nations by presenting non-binding United Nations
covenants as an indicator of the widespread acceptance of these torts as violations of international
law. Id. at 734-35. Despite the evidence produced by Alvarez, the Supreme Court rejected his
claims. Id. at 738.
[A]lthough it is easy to say that some policies of prolonged arbitrary detentions are so
bad that those who enforce them become enemies of the human race, it may be harder to
say which policies cross that line with the certainty afforded by Blackstone’s three
common law offenses. In any event, the label would never fit the reckless policeman
who botches his warrant, even though that same officer might pay damages under
municipal law.
Id. at 737.
124. Id. at 732. See infra notes 151-165 and accompanying text (analyzing the dangers of the
discretion left in the hands of the lower courts).
125. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. See supra note 101 (briefly outlining the reasons for Justice
Souter’s warning to be aware of consequences attached to the courts’ discretion); infra note 198
(providing a more complete recitation of Justice Souter’s reasons and connecting those reasons to
the foreign policy concerns of the political branches of the United States).
126. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733.
127. Id. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring). Where Justice Souter allowed the door to remain
slightly ajar, Justice Scalia insisted it be firmly shut. Id. at 746.
128. Id. at 743. Justice Scalia insisted this would have been an appropriate stopping point. Id.
The Court’s agreement that the ATS is jurisdictional only and does not provide for causes of action
in international law would have been sufficient to decide the present case. Id.
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that a general [federal] common law does not exist.”129 Justice Scalia
would require “law of nations” in the ATS to mean “the accepted
practices of nations in their dealings with one another” and on the high
sea.130
Justice Scalia’s dissatisfaction with Justice Souter’s treatment of the
ATS is fully embodied in his approach to federal common law and his
insistence that the door to that body of law cannot be opened because it
was closed in Erie.131 “Because today’s federal common law is not our
Framers’ general common law, the question presented by the suggestion
of discretionary authority to enforce the law of nations is not whether to
extend old-school general-common-law adjudication. Rather, it is
whether to create new federal common law.”132 Justice Scalia rejected
the plurality’s invitation to the lower courts to “create rights where
Congress has not authorized them to do so,” especially when the
plurality has acknowledged that the ATS is jurisdictional only, and that
this was understood both by the 1789 Congress and its modern
counterpart.133 Drawing from the precedent already emanating from the
federal courts, Justice Scalia predicted that the residual discretion left by
the plurality would have “quite terrified” the 1789 drafters of the
ATS.134 The “illegitimate lawmaking endeavor” will, in Justice Scalia’s
opinion, empower the lower courts to be the “principal actors,” with
only a “tiny fraction of their decisions” being reviewed by the Supreme
Court.135
This discretion troubled Justice Scalia because the
democratically created American law “does not recognize a category of

129. Id. at 744 (emphasis in original). The plurality, Justice Scalia complained, was instead
looking for a case or statute that “prevents federal courts from applying the law of nations as part of
the general common law.” Id. (emphasis in original).
130. Id. at 749. Those common laws would encompass the treatment of ambassadors,
sovereign immunity, and piracy. Id. Justice Scalia noted that these specific law of nations have
been incorporated into legislation such that these causes of action may survive despite the
destruction of federal common law. Id.
131. Id. at 746. This is where Justice Scalia disagreed with the plurality’s willingness to keep
the door ajar. Id. In his analysis, the door had already been shut by Erie. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 747. Justice Scalia feared the consequences of this discretion that allows “judicial
occupation of a domain that belongs to the people’s representatives.” Id. “One does not need a
crystal ball to predict that this occupation will not be long in coming, since the Court endorses the
reasoning of ‘many of the courts and judges who faced the issues before it reached this Court.’” Id.
(quoting the plurality’s opinion at 732).
134. Id. at 749. Conversely, Justice Scalia is confident that the Framers would have been
comfortable with his interpretation of the ATS in the post-Erie judicial world. Id.
135. Id. at 750. If all of the “future conversions of perceived international norms into
American law would be approved by [the Supreme Court] itself,” Justice Scalia would still be
troubled by the absence of the democratically elected representatives in the process. Id.
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activity that is so universally disapproved of by other nations that it is
automatically unlawful here, and automatically gives rise to a private
action for money damages in federal courts.”136
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Role of Customary International Law in Federal Courts
The ATS is in great need of a modern make-over. While Justice
Souter and the plurality are comfortable with leaving the door open to
re-examination as other international law claims come before the federal
courts, Justice Scalia’s closed-door approach is more appropriate until
Congress affirmatively legislates which international law and human
rights violations – if any – will be actionable under the ATS.137 The
current reality left by Sosa results in three potential courses for the
federal courts in ATS litigation: (1) following the spirit of the plurality’s
decision by restricting the claims of aliens to those most closely
resembling the laws contemplated by the First Congress when it
included the phrase “law of nations” in the ATS;138 (2) liberally
employing the discretion granted by the Supreme Court and squeezing
through the slightly ajar door a multitude of human rights claims
136. Id. at 751. Justice Scalia’s basis for abhorring the creation of common law by the federal
courts was the contradiction it poses to our accepted principle of democratically-chosen law-making
bodies. Id. He summarized this ideal, lamented the encroachment of the courts into legislative
territory and accused the plurality of endorsing the lawmaking behavior of the lower courts:
We Americans have a method for making the laws that are over us. We elect
representatives to two Houses of Congress, each of which must enact the new law and
present it for approval of a President, whom we also elect. For over two decades now,
unelected federal judges have been usurping this lawmaking power by converting what
they regard as norms of international law into American law. Today’s opinion approves
that process in principle, though urging the lower courts to be more restrained.
Id. at 750.
137. Id. at 730 (rejecting the argument that the ATS did not include causes of action because
such an interpretation would have rendered the statute non-functioning from its very start).
138. This course would, as the Supreme Court ultimately did, reject claims for more novel
human rights claims like the arbitrary arrest claims of Alvarez-Machain. See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at
738. One commentator, however, argues that the Supreme Court erred in not recognizing
transborder abductions as a violation of customary international law when Alvarez-Machain’s
criminal case was before the Court in 1992. Aceves, supra note 51, at 139. See also Stephen Fohn,
Do DEA Field Agents Have the Power to Unilaterally Execute a Trans-Border Abduction?: The
Ninth Circuit’s Take on Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 27 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 221, 233 (2004)
(analyzing the circumstances and consequences of Alvarez-Machain’s arrest). The Ninth Circuit
did find Alvarez-Machain’s alleged abduction actionable under the ATS by relying on the precedent
of Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that arbitrary
arrest and detention was actionable under the ATS). Id. at 233 n.79.
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recognized as customary law and read into the broad term “law of
nations” (in the manner of Filartiga);139 or (3) recognizing the lack of
common law to supply modern “law of nations” under the ATS, and
rejecting all claims under the ATS until Congress legislates specific
causes of action.140
1. A Norm of International Character, Specific, and Comparable to
18th Century Paradigms141
The Supreme Court preserved some opportunities for future ATS
claims by deciding Sosa on the basis that the alleged customary
international law that Alvarez-Machain relied upon did not achieve a
standard of universal specificity and resemblance to the 1789 version of
the law of nations.142 The slightly ajar door of the Sosa decision
implicitly allowed federal courts to determine which claims might be
included in the jurisdiction of the ATS; the plurality declined to establish
a body of actionable claims with any precision.143 The Supreme Court
did place some limitations on the federal courts’ discretion, requiring
that those causes of action rest on a “norm of international character
accepted by the civilized world and defined with specificity comparable
to the features of the 18th century paradigm.”144 Because the Court did
139. David L. Hudson, Jr., Foreign Turf: Human Rights Suits Against Corporations Hinge on
How Open the Door Is, 90 A.B.A. J. 20 (2004). The Supreme Court’s ruling in Sosa “that
potentially opened the door to suits against international corporations has left plenty of room to
widen the entranceway.”
Id.
Cases against ExxonMobil, Coca-Cola, Del Monte and
DaimlerChrysler “will determine exactly how much give is in the hinges.” Id. C.f. id. (presenting
the alternative interpretation of the Supreme Court’s ruling that it “will dismiss virtually all of the
existing cases”).
140. Leading Case, supra note 46, at 456.
141. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
142. Id. at 738 (declining to acknowledge transborder abduction as a customary law that could
be fitted inside the “law of nations” cause of action of the ATS).
143. Preserving the functionality of the ATS in this way might be considered consistent with
the original purpose for the ATS. Anthony D’Amato, Comment, The Alien Tort Statute and the
Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 62, 67 (1988). Although the “imperative security
interests that animated” the young and relatively defenseless nation to enact legislation that would
keep the stronger British and French from resorting to war when civil remedies were unavailable do
not concern the United States presently:
[T]he perception that we will deal fairly and impartially with cases having foreign
implications, and not make political bargaining chips out of them, is still significant in
terms of our national ideals, which include a free economic market, basic political
freedoms for all people and willingness to submit to the rule of law.
Id.
144. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 745. Those causes of action might “arguably now extend[] to ‘piracy,
slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps terrorism.’”
Casto, supra note 23, at 486 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED) § 404
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not expound beyond merely announcing the standard that should apply,
it is difficult to identify which claims the Supreme Court anticipates the
federal courts should recognize.145 The list could include “genocide,
extra-judicial killing, torture, war crimes, slavery, and extreme arbitrary
detention.”146 Leaving this door ajar, as proposed by Justice Souter,147
would supposedly invite only the most widely accepted customary
international law into federal courts.148 Only the closest adherence to
this standard by the federal courts would allow the true intent of the ATS
Framers to be realized.149

(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985)). The current version of the Restatement of Foreign Relations (Third)
includes an almost identical list where jurisdiction arises over “certain offenses recognized by the
community of nations as of universal concern.” RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
(THIRD) § 404 (2004). The important distinction here is that these “extensions” to the causes of
action under the ATS “appear to be based on specific intentional covenants and agreements rather
than customary law.” Casto, supra note 23, at 486; see generally Russell S. Kerr, U.S. Supreme
Court Leaves “Door Ajar,” 46 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. MAG. 22, 23 (2004) (discussing the
standard imposed by the Court).
145. Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Law Reveals
About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 113 (2004). “Applying
this test to a variety of purported new international norms will become a significant subject of
litigation in the lower courts in the wake of Sosa, litigation that could result in conflicting decisions
due to the Court’s scant description of the test it envisions.” Id. According to one human rights
proponent, who suggests that multinational corporations should have no complaints regarding the
new life given to the ATS by the Supreme Court, the violations that can be considered “specific,
universal and obligatory” are a “short list.” Jonathan Birchall, The Limits of Human Rights
Legislation: Alien Tort Statute: Jonathan Birchall on How Two Cases Have Tested the Scope of
Law Allowing U.S. Companies To Be Sued for Wrongs Committed Overseas, FINANCIAL TIMES,
January 20, 2005, at 13.
146. Birchall, supra note 145, at 13.
147. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
148. Kerr, supra note 144, at 23 (predicting that “[o]nly a few international tort claims brought
by foreigners will meet the ‘specificity’ criteria required of Sosa”). Drawing from the precedent set
by the Filartiga court and subsequent decisions, the courts might continue to recognize the
customary international laws that include “a universal abhorrence against torture, extra-judicial
killings, genocide, prolonged arbitrary, [sic] detentions, disappearances, and slavery.” Id. at 24.
But see Casto, supra note 23, at 475 (acknowledging the “serious doubt” as to “whether
international law, unassisted by domestic law, creates a tort remedy that may be invoked in
domestic courts by private individuals”). A cause of action that the federal courts might recognize
under the ATS and by virtue of the Sosa decision would be “an international remedy in name only.”
Id. at 477. Because the remedy would be absorbed into U.S. law in this manner, “[t]o suggest that
the remedy is based on international law would be disingenuous.” Id.
149. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 362. But see Kontorovich, supra note 145, at
155-56 (theorizing that only piracy can have a modern counterpart in customary international law
because it is the only action from the law of nations that was not limited to a “specially protected
classes of foreigners”). Following this line of reasoning, because “[m]odern human rights offenses
are not substantially ‘comparable’ to piracy, the benchmark offense,” the new customary law norms
cannot pass the standard set in Sosa. Id. at 161.
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2. A Restrained Discretion?150
More troublesome than the flexible standard discussed above is the
residual, undefined discretion left to the federal courts by the Sosa
decision to determine what claims to entertain under the ATS.151
Consistent with the Second Circuit’s Filartiga decision152 and the line of
cases that followed,153 Justice Souter would allow the federal courts to
continue to determine when U.S. courts have jurisdiction over various
human rights infractions, exposing the U.S. to foreign policy
complications long before these cases reach Supreme Court review.154
This discretion would authorize the “federal courts to define and enforce
violations of the law of nations in suits invoking the jurisdiction of the
federal courts under the ATS.”155 Because the Sosa Court did not
definitively close the door to undefined tort claims permitted under the
ATS (as Justice Scalia encouraged),156 the federal courts are now
empowered to become the judicial branch of worldwide human rights
litigation. By failing to articulate precisely the extent of the ATS’s
absorption of customary international law, the Supreme Court required
difficult determinations by the lower courts regarding the

150. See supra note 101 and infra note 198 (identifying Justice Souter’s five reasons for the
exercise of discretion by the lower courts).
151. David D. Caron & Brad R. Roth eds., International Decision: Scope of Alien Tort Statute
– Arbitrary Arrest and Detention as Violations of Custom, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 798, 804 (2004).
“The Sosa decision announces the existence of strict limits to the power of courts to establish
international law-based causes of action under the ATS, but does relatively little, in practical terms,
to specify those limits.” Id.
152. See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text (examining Filartiga).
153. See supra note 60 (listing the cases following Filartiga and their holdings).
154. Martin S. Flaherty, Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 169, 173 (2004). “Despite an excess of cautionary rhetoric, the Court in essence upheld
modern litigation under the [ATS] . . . the Sosa plurality guaranteed that the federal judiciary’s duty
to engage with international legal standards in ATS suits would continue.” Id.
155. Garre, supra note 65, at 4.
156. See infra notes 166-175 and accompanying text (analyzing an interpretation of the ATS
consistent with Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion). Justice Souter might have been indicating the
level of discretion left to the federal courts with the language he used to reject Alvarez-Machain’s
claim for arbitrary arrest and transborder abduction:
Whatever may be said for the broad principle Alvarez advances, in the present, imperfect
world, it expresses an aspiration that exceeds any binding customary rule having the
specificity we require. Creating a private cause of action to further that aspiration would
go beyond any residual common law discretion we think it appropriate to exercise. It is
enough to hold that a single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer
of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of
customary international law so well defined as to support the creation of a federal
remedy.
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738.
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appropriateness of ATS claims.157
Tempered only by the Supreme Court’s standard that the customary
law at hand be “accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms,”158
the federal courts will continue to produce a wide array of decisions that
stretch the concept of accepted customary international law.159 Because
the Sosa decision failed to delineate a precise expectation of the
discretion to be used, conflicting decisions in the lower courts are
likely.160 The lower courts will undoubtedly produce erratic decisions
and will allow claims other than those that have genuinely reached the
level of customary law.161 In fact,
[E]xperience teaches that the discovery of a new or forgotten judicial
power is often marked by efforts to experiment with and, in some
cases, abuse that power. Indeed, as a practical matter, lower courts that
were willing to infer international law-based causes of action from the
pure jurisdictional language of the ATS before Sosa may only be
emboldened by the court’s decision announcing that the federal courts
possess an inherent lawmaking authority when it comes to policing the
violation of customary international law norms the world over.162

The fluidity of the “residual common law discretion” signals hope
for human rights advocates,163 threatens the deep pockets of
multinational corporations,164 and has elicited opposition by the

157. See Leading Case, supra note 46, at 446 (lamenting that “Sosa failed to articulate a clear
conception of the interaction between customary international law and domestic law, and offers
little guidance to lower courts both within ATS doctrine and beyond”). The “rhetoric” of the Sosa
plurality cautioned against the expansion of the ATS to include claims arising from customary law,
but “fail[ed] to clarify one of the most important, and most opaque, elements in the opinion: its
articulation of the role of customary international law in U.S. law.” Id. at 451.
158. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. See supra notes 113-26 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court’s advisement that the international norms adhere to this standard); see also supra notes 14249 and accompanying text (exploring the usability of the ATS when held strictly to that standard).
159. An indicator of this liberal trend is the line of cases that followed Filartiga and preceded
Sosa. See supra note 60 (listing these cases and their holdings).
160. Kontorovich, supra note 145, at 113.
161. Leading Case, supra note 46, at 455; Kontorovich, supra note 145, at 113 (predicting
“conflicting decisions” as a result of the “scant description” of the Supreme Court test in Sosa).
162. Garre, supra note 64, at 4.
163. See Kochan, supra note 52, at 261-64 (suggesting that human rights organizations will
embrace the discretion given to the courts and capitalize on this leeway by increasing “customary
law outputs” that will bring additional human rights claims under ATS jurisdiction). See infra notes
178-182 and accompanying text (discussing the efforts of human rights activists).
164. See infra notes 183-189 and accompanying text (discussing the effect ATS litigation will
have on multinational corporations).
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executive branch of the U.S. government.165
3. “[T]he deed was done in Erie”166
The federal courts would be giving the ATS its most accurate
interpretation by recognizing that the extinction of federal common law
also destroyed any causes of action that arise from the customary
international law suggested by the “law of nations” in the ATS.167
Limiting the ATS’s substantive reach would be consistent with the
Supreme Court’s other efforts to restrict the “extraterritorial scope” of
the courts, which can interfere with the policy considerations of the
political branches.168 This approach would reduce the ATS to a statute
165. Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner, Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339). The Solicitor General echoed Justice Souter’s
wariness regarding the federal courts continued interference in the lawmaking realm of the political
branches, but issued a stronger warning in his brief to the Supreme Court in support of the petitioner
Sosa. Id. at 28.
The inherently indeterminate nature of customary international law makes it a singularly
ill-suited basis for the creation of private rights of action. Nor . . . does the idea of
judges searching through ungratified treaties and other sources of customary
international law documents to discover private rights have anything to recommend to it.
Indeed, if courts really had such an extraordinary power, then there would be little point
in the close scrutiny given to treaties and other international conventions by the Senate
and Executive in determining whether to ratify a treaty.
Id. at 28-29.
166. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 746 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia argued that there is no “‘door
to further independent judicial recognition of actionable international norms’ . . . ‘still ajar subject to
vigilant doorkeeping’” because Erie had already closed the door to general common law. Id.
(quoting plurality opinion at 729).
167. See Casto, supra note 23, at 477 (warning that an attempt to develop this type of
international common tort law “would lead the federal courts down a path similar to the one rejected
in Erie). But see Leading Case, supra note 46, at 452 (rejecting this position because it ignores “the
federal interest in vindicating international law norms as part of a unified foreign policy” and
“downplays the extent to which the intent behind the ATS was to empower the federal government
to act on such matters”). Justice Scalia might, in the opinion of one observer, be “conflat[ing] a
skepticism of the courts’ capacity to recognize modern customary norms with his views of the
effects wrought by Erie on judicial authority.” Id. Justice Scalia’s position that Erie precludes
customary international law from being a cause of action under the ATS is also flawed in that it is
inconsistent with his willingness to recognize claims for the “law of nations” as they existed in
1789. Id. at 452-53; see also supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Founding
Fathers’ concept of “law of nations”).
168. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 362. “The plan of the Constitution counsels
hesitation.” Casto, supra note 23, at 482. The exclusive foreign policy role of the presidency and
the congress’s responsibility for ratifying treaties and declaring war leaves little room for the
judiciary to enjoy a “policymaking role in matters concerning foreign policy.” Id. Considering the
Court’s other decisions to limit the extraterritorial scope of the courts, Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 32, at 362 n. 233, it seems incongruous that the plurality did not concur with Justice Scalia’s
wish to shut the door to international policy making by the courts. See id. The ATS invites such a
limit on extraterritorial scope in light of these other limiting decisions, and also because the
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allowing the claims of aliens only for law of nations violations
embedded in the original intent of the Framers: “Violations of safe
conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”169 To
do otherwise would perpetuate a modern trend of the federal courts to
impinge on the duties more appropriately handled by the other branches
of government: in this case making foreign policy decisions better left to
the Executive.170 It is unlikely that the First Congress ever intended the
ATS to create “federal substantive rights” or the “federal common law
making” that the plurality’s decision authorizes.171 Giving the statute an
interpretation that is inconsistent with Erie is “a structurally
objectionable step.”172 The ATS should have new life as a viable
international subject matter particularly infringes on the political branches’ role in creating foreign
policy. Id. Additionally, the 1789 drafters of the ATS would never have considered such liberal
discretion in the courts. Id.
169. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 359. Customary international law cannot be
incorporated into the ATS “law of nations” because the eighteenth century understanding of
international law would not have included the modern concept of human rights issues that
encompasses “the way a foreign nation treats its citizens.” Id. Despite the obscure origins of the
ATS, there is a strong consensus that the ATS “does not create a statutory cause of action. The
statute is purely jurisdictional and the first Congress undoubtedly understood this to be the case.”
Casto, supra note 23, at 479 (internal footnotes omitted). An alternative school of thought,
however, is that customary international law exists outside of the federal common law, and is
instead a separate body of substantive law that can be applied in appropriate cases where the court
has jurisdiction over an international issue. Aleinikoff, supra note 53, at 97.
170. See supra note 168 (setting forth the authority which supports this contention).
171. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 359. While conceding that there are multiple
constructions of the ATS, some of which are “more plausible than others,” these authors suggest
that focusing on the original language of the ATS reveals precisely what the First Congress
intended: that the district courts have “cognizance” – or jurisdiction – over the claims of aliens, but
stops short of granting the courts the power of substantive law making. Id. at 358-59. This
jurisdiction-only interpretation is bolstered by the modern codification of the ATS at 28 U.S.C.
§1350 where jurisdiction is substituted for “cognizance.” Casto, supra note 23, at 479. See
generally Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries Into
the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1 (1985) (discussing the jurisdictional aspects
of the ATS). But see William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some
Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT’L. L. 687, 689-90 (2002) (arguing that the First
Congress could not have realized the need to articulate anything further than jurisdiction because
“cause of action” as we understand it today did not exist in the early American legal consciousness)
[hereinafter Dodge, Constitutionality]. “The First Congress assumed that torts in violation of the
law of nations would be cognizable at common law, just as any other tort would be.” Id. at 690; see
also Haberstroh, supra note 26, at 249. Courts that do not recognize a cause of action in the ATS
give the statute an “ahistorical” interpretation. Dodge, Constitutionality, supra, at 690. The federal
courts that do “read the [ATS] as granting a cause of action,” such as the Filartiga court, do so
“precisely to eliminate this anachronism.” Id.
172. J. Harvey Wilkinson, III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1694
(2004). “[I]n breaching the line between prescriptive and interpretive power, the Court risked a
retreat to the [pre-Erie era], which assigned to the judiciary, under the guise of federal common law,
an impermissible prescriptive task.” Id. But see Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Alien Tort Claims Act:
Theoretical and Historical Foundations of the Alien Tort Claims Act and Its Discontents: A Reality
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jurisdictional statute in U.S. courts only after Congress codifies those
international law causes of action for which jurisdiction can apply.173 If
a lack of authority for the federal courts to create federal common law
were properly acknowledged,174 the courts could not recognize any
causes of action under the ATS, even as extrapolation from the core
conceptual basis of the Founder’s “law of nations.”175
B. The Alien Tort Statute’s Modern Importance
Regardless of the interpretation given to the ATS, the efforts of
litigators have already resurrected the statute, and it will play a pivotal
role in the United States approach to human rights violations,
cooperation with multinational corporations, and its own foreign
policy.176 Observers can glean the potential consequences of Sosa from
the range of amicus curiae briefs filed in the case.177
Check, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 585, 605 (2004) (attacking the argument that the Filartiga line of
cases needs to be abrogated).
[T]hose who would gut the [ATS] through judicial interpretation or Congressional repeal
offer a non-solution to a non-problem by exaggerating the law of nations as some
expansive and amorphous body of law created without the dominant influence of the
United States for more than two centuries, underestimating the ability of the courts to
derail abusive or frivolous lawsuits, and underestimating the value of the [ATS] in
assuring that the United States does not become a safe haven for abusers.
Id.
173. Leading Case, supra note 46, at 456. The “nebulous” decision in Sosa could very well be
a “cry for congressional help.” Id.
174. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 741 (Scalia, J., concurring).
175. This focused interpretation of the ATS would render the statute practically worthless until
Congress initiates legislation to expand the statute. See infra note 197 (suggesting that Congress
does so). Justice Scalia would likely be unwilling to allow ATS as the jurisdictional basis for an
alien’s claim in federal court unless the famous pirate Blackbeard were named as a defendant.
176. See infra notes 178-196 and accompanying text (outlining each of these ways in which the
ATS will be implicated). To briefly illustrate the pronounced presence the ATS will have in the
coming years, consider one potential alien plaintiff relying on the ATS for jurisdiction in a U.S.
federal court: Osama Bin Laden. Jamie Shapiro, Note and Comment, Aliens’ Redress of Grievances
Against the United States for International Human Rights Violations, 10 SW. J. OF L. & TRADE AM.
195, 217 (2003/2004). If ever captured, the number one enemy of the United States could have a
claim nearly analogous to the one posited by Alvarez-Machain. Id.
177. The organizations that filed briefs are as varied as the potential post-Sosa ATS litigation.
Writing briefs in support of the Petitioner were: The Pacific Legal Foundation (a nonprofit public
interest group providing “a voice in the courts for thousands of Americans who believe in
constitutionally grounded government, including adherence to the principles of separation of
powers, democratic consent, and limited federal judicial powers.)” Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific
Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 1, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No.
03-339); Professors of International Law, Federal Jurisdiction and the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States (a group of law professors with noted expertise in those disciplines), Brief for
Professors of International Law, Federal Jurisdiction and the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339); the
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Washington Legal Foundation (a nonprofit public interest group devoted to issues “involving
national security, civil-justice reform and federalism and opposes the expansion of federal-court
jurisdiction beyond appropriate statutory and constitutional limits”), the National Fraternal Order of
Police (a 310,000 member law enforcement labor organization), and the Allied Education
Foundation (a charitable foundation engaged in promoting “education in diverse areas of study,
such as law and public policy”), Brief of Washington Legal Foundation, National Fraternal Order of
Police, and Allied Educational Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1-2, Sosa,
542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339); the National Association of Manufacturers (“the nation’s largest broadbased industrial trade association,” with many of its members having operations abroad), Brief for
the National Association of Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal at 1, Sosa, 542
U.S. 692 (No. 03-339); and the National Foreign Trade Council (“the premier business organization
advocating a rules-based world economy” with over 300 member companies), USA*Engage (a
broad-based coalition “concerned about the proliferation of unilateral foreign policy sanctions at the
federal, state, and local levels”), the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America (“the
world’s largest business federation” with over three million members doing business in the United
States and around the world), the United States Council for Organization in International Investment
(“a business advocacy and policy development group” serving as the “American affiliate of the
International Chamber of Commerce and International Organization of Employers), the
International Chamber of Commerce (the world business organization which represents the
chambers of commerce and other business associations of 130 countries, with a goal to “promote
multilateral trade among nations in the interest of global prosperity”), the Organization for
International Investment (“the largest business association in the United States representing the
interests of U.S. subsidiaries of international companies”), the Business Roundtable (“an association
of CEOs of leading U.S. corporations . . . committed to vigorous economic growth, a dynamic
global economy, and the well-trained and productive U.S. workforce essential for future
competitiveness”), the American Petroleum Institute (a 450 member group from “all aspects of the
petroleum industry . . . operat[ing] throughout the world as part of their commitment to meet
America’s energy needs”), and the US-ASEAN Business Council (“America’s leading private
business organization dedicated to promoting increased trade and investment between the United
States and the member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations”), Brief for the
National Foreign Trade Council, USA*Engage, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, the United States Council for Organization in International Investment, the International
Chamber of Commerce, the Organization for International Investment, the Business Roundtable, the
American Petroleum Institute, and the US-ASEAN Business Council as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 1-3, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339)[hereinafter NFTC et al. Brief].
Those organizations and groups filing briefs in support of the Respondent AlvarezMachain were: National and Foreign Legal Scholars (75 scholars from nations around the world,
“including Australia, Canada, Ireland, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom,
and the United States”), Brief of Amici Curiae National and Foreign Legal Scholars in Support of
Respondents at 1, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339); Hungarian Jews (plaintiffs in a pending U.S.
District Court case alleging claims against the United States under the ATS for failure to return
“personal possessions and family heirlooms . . . accepted into protective custody”)
and
Bougainvilleans (plaintiffs in an ATS case alleging claims of “genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity” against a private corporation), Brief of Amici Curiae Alien Friends Representing
Hungarian Jews and Bougainvilleans Interests in Support of Respondent at 1, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692
(No. 03-339); Professors of Federal Jurisdiction and Legal History (a group of professors with
expertise in the relevant areas interested in the “proper understanding and interpretation of the
[ATS]”), Brief of Professors of Federal Jurisdiction and Legal History as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents at 1, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339); Corporate Social Responsibility Amici (a
collection of international groups working “to develop, implement or support mechanisms to
improve corporate compliance with human rights standards in the global economy”), Brief of Amici
Curiae Corporate Social Responsibility Amici in Support of Respondent at 1, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692
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1. Human Rights Activists Emboldened
By not seizing the opportunity to forever banish international
human rights claims from federal courts, the Supreme Court sustained
hope for numerous human rights victims and their supporting
organizations.178 The ATS, when given the interpretation of the
(No. 03-339) [hereinafter CSR Amici Brief]; the Presbyterian Church of Sudan (“an unincorporated
association of more than 35,000 members of the Presbyterian faith” that is a plaintiff in a class
action ATS case against a Canadian oil company, Talisman Energy, Inc. that allegedly collaborated
to commit “genocide, war crimes, extrajudicial murder, forcible displacement, torture and other
crimes against humanity” in which “[c]hurches, congregations and ministers are alleged to be
particular targets”) and the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (intending “to
support its sister denominations around the world”), Brief for the Presbyterian Church of Sudan and
Clifton Kirkpatrick as Stated Clerk of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 1-2, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339); Career Foreign
Service Diplomats (twenty-eight U.S. Foreign Service members, many of whom served as
ambassadors), Brief of Amici Curiae Career Foreign Service Diplomats in Support of Respondent at
1-9, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339); Women’s Human Rights Organizations (a gathering of
numerous U.S. and foreign women’s human rights organizations “working to end impunity for
grave violations of human rights of women, to challenge violations, and to support women seeking
justice”), Brief as Amici Curiae of Women’s Human Rights Organizations in Support of
Respondent at 1, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339); Human Rights Organizations and Religious
Organizations (“dozens of human rights organizations and religious organizations working to
protect basic human rights in this country and around the world”), Brief of Amici Curiae
International Human Rights Organizations and Religious Organizations in Support of Respondent at
1, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339) [hereinafter Human Rights Organizations Brief]; International
Jurists (“jurists who have served as judges and experts on international human rights bodies around
the world”), Brief of Amici Curiae International Jurists in Support of Affirmance at 1, Sosa, 542
U.S. 692 (No. 03-339); Surviving family members of the victims of the September 11, 2001
Terrorist Attacks (wishing “to ensure that every survivor of terrorist attacks, and the family
members of those who perish in terrorist attacks, regardless of their nationality, are able to pursue
civil suits against terrorists”), Brief of Amici Curiae Surviving Family Members of the Victims of
the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks in Support of Respondents at 1, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No.
03-339); and the World Jewish Congress (“an international federation of Jewish communities . . .
that played a leading role in the Holocaust restitution movement, which included litigation using the
[ATS]”) and the American Jewish Committee (“a national human relations organization . . . founded
to protect the civil rights and religious liberty of Jews”), Brief for the World Jewish Congress and
the American Jewish Committee as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1-2, Sosa, 542 U.S.
692 (No. 03-339).
The European Commission (“the executive body of the European Community, a treatybased international organization that has competence to develop and enforce Community-wide
legislation in specified areas of policy”) filed a Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party.
Brief of Amicus Curiae the European Commission in Support of Neither Party at 1, Sosa, 542 U.S.
692 (No. 03-339).
178. Baluarte, supra note 91, at 13. While criticizing the Court for “miss[ing] an opportunity
to promote international norms that apply to all countries,” Baluarte urges that activists should not
be deterred. Id. See also Elizabeth F. Defeis, Litigating Human Rights Abuses in United States
Courts: Recent Developments, 10 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 319, 319 (2004) (suggesting that the
ATS is “[t]he most utilized legislative device for reaching human rights abuses” and inferring that
favorable interpretation of the ATS would preserve this important avenue for addressing human
rights issues). But see Wynne P. Kelley, Comment, Citizens Cannot Stand For It Anymore: How
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Filartiga court or Justice Souter’s “ajar door” approach, is “a basic tool
to apply limited – but binding – standards to corporations in their
international operations.”179 The accessibility of federal courts to human
rights victims has numerous positives.180 However, in order to preserve
judicial resources and prevent abuse of the federal court system by
litigious aliens, the courts must restrict this access by recognizing only
those victims of the most widely accepted customary international law
violations.181 Human rights activists will seize on to the ATS as a means
to redress the violations of the host nations where multinational

The United States’ Environmental Actions in Afghanistan and Iraq Go Unchecked by Individuals
and Non-Governmental Organizations, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 193, 227 (2004) (lamenting the
narrowness of the Sosa decision for its implied preclusion from ATS litigation of potential
environmentally related human rights claims with potential damages over $20 billion).
179. Terry Collingsworth, “Corporate Social Responsibility,” Unmasked, 16 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 669, 686 (2004). See Sonia Jimenez, Note and Comment, The Alien Tort Claims Act: A Tool
for Repairing Ethically Challenged U.S. Corporations, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 721 (2004); Gabriel
D. Pinilla, Note and Comment, Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations on Foreign Soil: A
Historical and Prospective Analysis of the Alien Tort Claims Controversy, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
687 (2004).
180. Human Rights Organizations Brief, supra note 177. The human rights organizations’
argue in support of a liberally construed ATS because the ATS provides a means of enforcement
that is otherwise hard to come by. Id. at 2.
Despite the universal condemnation of these human rights violations, perpetrators all too
often escape punishment. Finding means to hold perpetrators accountable is a key
priority for governments, including the U.S. government, as well as for international and
nongovernmental organizations around the world. Domestic and international actors
have undertaken varied initiatives, including criminal prosecutions initiated both by
public prosecutors and by private individuals, civil litigation, and assorted administrative
proceedings. Each state chooses mechanisms appropriate to its local legal system. Civil
litigation under the [ATS] is part of a global effort to address impunity and to hold
perpetrators of egregious abuses accountable for their actions.
Id.
181. While encouraging a modernized “law of nations” and the use of the ATS for the human
rights claims of aliens, one observer warns that enthusiastic human rights activists “may actually
threaten the statute, when they attempt to use [ATS] to attack wrongs, such as the softer shades of
third-party complicity, which a world consensus has not decided are in violation of customary
international law.” Haberstroh, supra note 26, at 271. Additional concerns surround the economic
viability of nations that might be saddled with large damages from ATS litigation. HUFBAUER &
MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 13. Those countries include Saudi Arabia,
Abu Dhabi, Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria, Burma, Egypt, Germany, Papua New Guinea, Japan,
Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, Sudan, and South Africa. Id. Japan and Germany were included in this
list because they were exposed to ATS litigation on the basis of their egregious human rights
violations during World War II. Id. A corollary exists between poverty-stricken nations and a “low
regard for human rights, measured against US standards, coupled with limited political and
economic freedom.” Id. Monetary liability in U.S. courts could therefore severely impede these
impoverished nations from ever improving their economic situation and, in turn, contribute to their
failure to rectify their almost unavoidable (although inexcusable) violations of human rights. Id. at
13-14.
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corporations are often immersed in human rights predicaments.182
2. Multinational Corporations Threatened
The potential litigation against multi-national corporations under
the ATS raises concern for American businesses and their continued
competitiveness in the global economy.183 Despite activists’ strong
support for federal jurisdiction over human rights violations, concerns
emerge as to the impact this course could have on major U.S.
corporations, specifically those with multinational operations.184
182. See supra note 60 (detailing the numerous human rights cases brought in federal courts
using Filartiga’s liberal ATS interpretation); see also Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, International
Implications, supra note 7, at 607 (postulating that thousands of Chinese citizens could invoke the
ATS – “organized by plaintiffs’ attorneys and supported by international human rights groups” –
against multinational corporations for “abetting” China’s alleged human rights violations); Paul
Magnusson, A Milestone for Human Rights, BUSINESS WEEK, January 24, 2005, at 63 (listing the
major U.S. corporations who are, or will likely be, defending ATS suits). “Other defendants include
Coca-Cola, Drummond, Occidental Petroleum, and Del Monte Foods.” Magnusson, supra. See
generally Mark J. Leavy, Note, Discrediting Human Rights Abuse as an “Act of State”: a Case
Study on the Repression of the Falun Gong in China and Commentary on International Human
Rights Law in U.S. Courts, 35 RUTGERS L. J. 749 (2004) (examining the pending companion cases
of Chinese plaintiffs directly against the government officials of the People’s Republic of China and
relying on the ATS for jurisdiction in U.S. courts). See also Oscar Gonzales, Attacking the ATS:
Prison Abuse Scandal Highlights Need for Access to U.S. Courts, 20 TX LAW., July 12, 2004
(identifying the already-filed claims of Iraqi prisoners using the ATS as the basis for their
jurisdiction for their claims against U.S. private contractors of torture and executions at the
infamous Abu Ghraib prison and other Iraqi detention facilities).
183. U.S. companies with direct ties to countries with human rights issues are prone to ATS
litigation. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 37; see supra note
181 (listing the foreign states that are categorized as nations with human rights issues). This
includes companies engaged in oil and mineral imports from foreign nations, but also those
exporting U.S. goods to the same nations. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER,
supra note 7, at 16. Even institutions which lend money to those nations may be susceptible. Id. at
17. “It is no exaggeration to say that every major international bank is exposed to ATS liability.”
Id. “[T]he ATS has been transformed from its intended role as a jurisdictional provision applicable
to a small class of cases into a serious impediment to companies engaged in international trade,
investment, and operations, and a major irritant to the United States in its dealing with other
nations.” NFTC et al. Brief, supra note 177, at 5. But see CSR Amici Brief, supra note 177, at 6
(arguing that the multinational corporations exaggerate the effect the ATS will have on their profits
and accusing these corporations of interfering with the “substantial precedent demonstrating that the
U.S. has been a leader in applying the rule of law to human rights violations”). “The [ATS]’s very
limited scope poses absolutely no threat to foreign investment by U.S. companies.” Id.
184. See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 1-2 (outlining
a “nightmare scenario” if the ATS interpretation can reach multinational corporations and warning
that “trial lawyers will seek to expand the scope of the ATS . . . to such an extent that investment
and trade in developing countries will be seriously threatened”). Because the ATS has only in
recent years been suggested as a litigation tool against corporate defendants, it is difficult to
ascertain the “potential scope of ATS litigation.” Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, International
Implications, supra note 7, at 615. The possible breadth of claims is comparable to the asbestos
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Multinational corporations risk exposure to human rights litigation by
virtue of doing business in a country that perpetrates, sponsors, endorses,
or even tolerates human rights abuses.185 If these multinational
corporations are subject to alien tort claims, the magnitude of the
damages would be noticeable in the U.S. economy.186 In the minds of
the foremost trade and business organizations in the United States, “the
erroneous interpretation and expansion of the [ATS] . . . wreaks
economic damage.”187 Corporations are already settling suits188 to avoid
litigation of the late 20th century. Id. “Asbestos spawned the largest mass tort litigation in legal
history,” Id. at 614, with over 300 corporate defendants named and damages at $54 billion and
growing. Id. at 614 n.41.
185. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 9. Multinational
corporations are sued for “aiding and abetting” human rights violations, particularly when sovereign
immunity precludes the alien plaintiffs from suing the offending foreign state itself. Id. The circuit
courts have permitted these aiding and abetting claims against multinational corporations, requiring
only that the corporation gave “knowing practical assistance or encouragement which has a
substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.” Id. (quoting Doe v. Unocal Corp, 395 F.3d 932,
947 (9th Cir 2002)). The claims against corporations range from “environmental torts, expropriated
property claims, and human rights violations committed by host governments.” Konrad L. Cailteux
and B. Keith Gibson, “Alien Tort Statute” Shakedown: Court Must Arrest New Attempt to Expand
Mischievous U.S. Law, 20 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, January 14, 2005. See generally Ronen
Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the Contested Concept of
Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635, 637-43 (2004) (laying out the general
background of ATS cases against multinational corporations). The claims against corporations are
“based on dubious theories of vicarious liability.” Cailteux & Gibson, supra. The claims
significantly affect the operations of these corporations because “[a]lthough most courts have
recognized the impropriety of these suits, and have dismissed the claims, this influx of cases has
cost United States corporations significant, unnecessary legal fees, discovery costs, and lost
employee time.” Id. But see Gonzales, supra note 182 (arguing that corporations should have had
fair warning “all along about the importance of ATS compliance”). Gonzales argues that, rather
than focusing their energies on improving human rights conditions, “all corporate America’s
energies are focused on advancing anti-ATS arguments that are, generously speaking, suspect.” Id.
186. NFTC et al. Brief, supra note 177, at 5. The multi-national corporations mobilized to
assert their opposition to the inclusion of customary law in the ATS for the Supreme Court’s
decision for Sosa because they recognized the potential economic impact exposure to ATS litigation
would cause them. See generally HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note
7, at 37- 43 (hypothesizing on the economic impact ATS legislation will have in the United States).
But see Collingsworth, supra note 179, at 670 (criticizing the business community because it
“simply could not resist going after the [ATS] at full bore at the first opportunity to nip in the bud
any prospect that the U.S. companies could possibly be held accountable for human rights violations
committed in the course of their international operations”). By “collectively seeking the repeal of
the [ATS],” suggests one human rights proponent, “the U.S. multinational business community has
repudiated the public trust.” Id. at 671.
187. NFTC et al. Brief, supra note 177, at 4. The culprits, in the eyes of these business
associations, are the human rights activists lobbying for a liberal interpretation of the ATS. Id.
“Foreign plaintiffs and the lawyers and organizations supporting them – often pursuing thinly
disguised political agendas – have adopted the statute as a vehicle to embarrass foreign governments
and to pressure businesses to abandon operations in targeted nations.” Id. However, the expense of
ATS litigation might be a positive component. Emeka Duruigbo, The Economic Cost of Alien Tort
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the escalating litigation successfully squeezed through the door for alien
tort claims against multinational corporations in U.S. federal courts –
suggesting that Justice Souter’s slightly ajar door could easily be thrown
open.189
3. U.S. Foreign Policy Implications
The political branches of the U.S. government have much to
consider after the Court’s decision in Sosa.190 The continued use of the

Litigation: A Response to Awakening Monster: Alien Tort Statute of 1789, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 1, 30 (2004). “It could be that at the end of the day, society would view the protection of
human rights as an overwhelming consideration that trumps business interests, regardless of cost.”
Id.
188. Magnusson, supra note 182, at 63. The most notable of recent ATS suits was settled in
early 2005. Id. The suit arose from the following summary of events:
In the mid-1990s, reports emerged out of Burma that villagers in the remote Yadana
region had been forced by the military to clear jungle for the construction of a $1.2
billion natural gas pipeline. The allegations were horrendous: To round up workers for
the project, the Burmese military had resorted to torture, rape, and murder to enslave
villagers, even throwing one woman’s baby in a fire after killing her husband. Before
long, U.S. human rights groups had filed suit against Unocal Corp., based in El Segundo,
Calif., one of the four pipeline partners, on behalf of 15 unnamed Burmese villagers.
Id. Unocal has allegedly (court gag orders are still in place) settled the suit for $30 million in
damages. Id. The settlement is significant because it hints at U.S. corporations accepting
responsibility for their involvement in human rights violations. Id.; see Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248
F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Shannon O’Leary, Human Rights Case Sounds Alarm for U.S.
Multinationals, CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES, December, 2004 (similarly summarizing the Doe v.
Unocal Corp. case and connecting the settlement to other ATS litigation).
189. See generally HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 13
(anticipating litigation of the same magnitude as multi-billion dollar damages of the asbestos cases);
Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, International Implications, supra note 7, at 615 (predicting the same).
One observer offers a plan of action for corporations “to mitigate potential backlash while not
curbing growth.” Pinilla, supra note 179, at 719.
This primarily involves thorough self-assessment and evaluations of local business
practices. Once this first step is taken, companies must try to influence partners abroad
to meet international human rights standards, much like quality control standards
imposed on foreign supply chain partners. If emerging markets prove too enticing and
immune from influence, corporations should take steps to create walls clearly separating
themselves from irresponsible conduct and players while at the same time reducing the
appearance that the commission of these violations is of benefit to corporate entities.
Id. ATS litigation is being lauded for raising awareness of human rights violations in the minds of
corporate decision makers. Shamir, supra note 185, at 660-61. The ATS, “by forcing the issue of
corporations and human rights into the open, already shapes corporate behavior because it forces
corporations to reflect upon, if not to institutionalize, human rights-related issues.” Id.
190. Although it was initially suggested that the United States itself would be exposed to
litigation under the ATS because of the door left open by the Supreme Court, the combination of the
ATS issue and the FTCA issue decided in Sosa likely will prohibit future claims that directly target
the U.S. government. Baluarte, supra note 89, at 11; see also supra note 90 (outlining the Court’s
outcome on the FTCA claim).
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ATS in its modern context conflicts with its original purpose such that it
may threaten the status of international relations.191 The current
administration views the interpretation of the ATS advanced by the
Filartiga line of cases as dangerous.192 For an administration that has
made considerable attempts to protect businesses and bolster the
economy, it follows that it would encourage a narrow and literal
interpretation of the ATS.193 But, beyond this business-friendly
administration’s goal of preserving the economy and nurturing a
receptive home for large players in that economy, the executive branch
seeks to ensure that ATS litigation does not compromise its foreign
policy strategies.194 The “War on Terror” presents additional concerns
191. Reply Brief for the United States as Respondents Supporting Petitioner, Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339). The discretion given to the circuits “would grant
authority to the courts to engage in a function that the Constitution vests in the political branches”
and “would permit the courts effectively to nullify the actions of the political branches in the realm
of foreign affairs.” Id. at 9. Rather than serving as “a shield to protect foreign governmental
officials from torts committed in the United States” – the original impetus for the ATS, see supra
notes 25-30 and accompanying text (discussing the motives for the enactment of the ATS in 1789),
– the ATS becomes “a sword to hold them civilly liable for tortious acts that took place abroad.”
Bradley and Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 361. This modern application of the ATS will not, for the
most part, “promote amicable inter-national [sic] relations.” Id. If ATS litigation unfolds as
estimated, “the United States will be widely castigated for imposing its brand of justice worldwide.”
Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, International Implications, supra note 7, at 625. The civil suits would
entail the “American-style justice” of punitive damages and class actions. HUFBAUER &
MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 48. There is also the distinct possibility
that the courts’ judgments will misrepresent to the international community the United States’
stance on controversial topics because
[i]n ATS litigation, U.S. courts are called on to lay blame for international controversies.
The entry of judgment in an ATS case may create the impression to citizens of other
countries that the U.S. government has taken sides in an international dispute, which
may interfere with the efforts of the executive branch and Congress to calibrate an
appropriate foreign policy concerning a particular dispute.
Garre, supra note 65 at 4. The judicial branch’s “judgment on the actions of a foreign state . . .
may well jeopardize sensitive negotiations.” HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER,
supra note 7, at 48.
192. Stephens, supra note 26, at 173. In opposition to the ATS, the White House has sought
“to shield human rights abusers from accountability in U.S. Courts and to grant the executive branch
the sole power to pick and chose who should be held liable and in what forum.” Id.; see also Leavy,
supra note 182, at 818 (noting the Bush administration’s challenge of jurisdiction in the Sosa case).
193. Stephens, supra note 26, at 178. Business organizations suggest that ATS litigation will
not only disrupt the foreign policy agendas of the United States, but also interfere with its trade
policy because the threat of ATS litigation discourages businesses from conducting trade as normal.
NFTC et al. Brief, supra note 177, at 4. “[T]he Bush Administration [has] argued that companies
shouldn’t be held to a ‘vicarious liability’ standard but should instead be held blameless unless
involved directly in the crimes.” Magnusson, supra note 182, at 63; see also O’Leary, supra note
188, at 68 (suggesting that U.S. corporations “have a powerful ally on its side” in the present
presidential administration).
194. Defeis, supra note 178, at 322 (2004) (referring to the government position taken in a
brief it filed on behalf of another ATS defendant “stating that if the case were allowed to go to trial,
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for the Bush administration; in particular, its approach to the handling of
prisoners has been highly controversial.195 Justice Souter was conscious
of the fact that ATS litigation would elicit some foreign policy-making
by the courts, advising that “[s]ince many attempts by federal courts to
craft remedies for the violation of new norms of international law would
raise risks of adverse foreign policy consequences, they should be
undertaken, if at all, with great caution.”196
4. Action by Congress
Perhaps the only way to truly remedy the cloudiness of the ATS is
for Congress to address it.197 Justice Souter aptly cautioned against
it would interfere with American foreign policy, and may disrupt the war on terrorism”). See supra
note 190 (describing some of the potential interference in U.S. foreign affairs).
195. Richey, supra note 3, at 2. “[T]he Alien Tort Statute could complicate the Bush
administration’s war on terror by subjecting foreign individuals assisting in the detention and
questioning of Al Qaeda suspects to potential liability in US courts for alleged human rights abuses
conducted in overseas jails and interrogation chambers.” Richey, supra note 3, at 2. See generally
Juan E. Mendez, Review of David Cole’s Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional
Freedoms in the War on Terrorism, 30 J.C. & U.L. 493 (2004) (book review) (highlighting the
United States’ obligations under international law specifically related to the detainees of the War on
Terror); Ronald J. Riccio, Court Rules on Power to Detain Prisoners of the War on Terror and on
the Limits of the ‘Bush Doctrine,’ 177 N.J.L.J. 321 (2004) (discussing the Sosa decision as it relates
to the detention of terrorist prisoners). But see supra note 190 (discussing the only remote
likelihood of the United States becoming directly subject to liability for its own human rights
violations under the ATS as a result of the protection afforded by the FTCA). But see Gonzales,
supra note 182 (criticizing the attempt of the government and corporations to immunize themselves
“from their misdeeds in foreign lands”). “[I]f we lose sight of the weightiness of underlying ATS
claims, all we need to do is glance at those damned Iraqi prisoner photos.” Id.
196. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727-28 (2004). The federal courts, Justice
Souter warned, should be “particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and
Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.” Id. at 727. It is interesting to note that, while
Justice Souter advised caution when the courts tread on the ground of foreign policy-making, he did
not specifically instruct the courts to avoid the area altogether. Wilkinson, supra note 172, at 1694.
Nevertheless, the Court “admonished the federal judiciary to exercise this power in a manner that
would not trespass unduly upon the powers of the political branches in foreign affairs. Id. One
recent scholar suggests that there is a history of judicial presence in foreign affairs. Ariel N.
Lavinbuk, Note, Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An Empirical Study of
the Supreme Court’s Docket, 114 YALE L.J. 855, 886 (2005). Analyzing the types of international
issues in which the courts involved themselves might be helpful in identifying “[t]he proper role for
courts in foreign affairs.” Id. at 896.
197. Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, International Implications, supra note 7, at 624. “Whatever the
result, only the creator of the beast may put it to proper purpose.” Id. “[I]t may prove difficult for
the federal courts to arrest the sprawling sweep of ATS litigation in a timely fashion. Hence our
core recommendations are addressed to the Congress: legislation can most efficiently correct the
unlimited sweep of ATS claims.” HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note
7, at 49. At the least, Congress should specify whether the jurisdictional grant of the ATS also
“allows for the creation of common law causes of action.” Leading Case, supra note 46, at 456.
“More specifically, Congress might step in to clarify the scope of its hoary grant of jurisdiction over
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policy-making by the courts and recognized that the more appropriate
action would be for Congress to make the ATS functional in today’s
courts without requiring that the federal courts became international
legislators.198 Rather than than asking the courts to decide what the
international law is, lobbyists of both human rights groups and
multinational corporations199 could more appropriately devote their
energies toward Congress to enact protective legislation.200
V. CONCLUSION
The unique history of the ATS warrants its preservation in the
modern structure of our judiciary.201 The accepted interpretation of the
Founding Fathers’ impetus for creating jurisdiction over the claims of
aliens for certain international violations is not as prevalent today, but
the spirit of their concern continues to resonate in present time.202
alien tort claims, sparing courts a difficult and uncertain inquiry in every ATS case.” Id. A
proponent of the incorporation of customary international law into the U.S. legal system reminds us
“that Congress has the authority to adopt legislation that would make [customary international law]
applicable in federal courts” and proposes that Congress does so. Aleinikoff, supra note 53, at 9192. See also Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Supreme Court Overturns Alvarez-Machain Claim, But Upholds
Alien Tort Law, INT’L ENFORCEMENT LAW REPORTER, September, 2004, (recognizing the most
effective way to limit ATS litigation is for Congress to enact legislation to that effect).
198. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004). Justice Souter presented five
deterrents to the federal courts’ recognition of causes of action under the ATS. Id. at 725-728.
“First, the prevailing conception of the common law has changed since 1789 in a way that counsels
restraint in judicially applying internationally generated norms.” Id. at 725. “Second, along with,
and in part driven by that conceptual development in understanding common law has come an
equally significant rethinking of the role of the federal courts in making it.” Id. at 726 (citing Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). “Third, this Court has recently and repeatedly said that a
decision to create a private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great
plurality of cases.” Id. at 727.
Fourth, the subject of those collateral consequences is itself a reason for a high bar to
new private causes of action for violating international law, for the potential implications
of foreign relations of the United States of recognizing such causes should make courts
particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive
Branches in managing foreign affairs.
Id. Lastly, Justice Souter could find “no congressional mandate to seek out and define new and
debatable violations of the law of nations, and modern indications of congressional understanding of
the judicial role in the field have not affirmatively encouraged greater judicial creativity.” Id. at
728.
199. See supra note 177 for a list (in the form of those that filed amici brief in Sosa) of many
organizations that would likely join this effort.
200. See generally Gonzales, supra note 182 (discussing the focus of energy put into pro- and
anti-ATS decisions by the courts).
201. See supra notes 23-66 and accompanying text (discussing the historical context of the
ATS).
202. See supra notes 23-66 and accompanying test (discussing the historical context of the
ATS). The United States continues with increasing frequency to be involved in international
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However, the long period of stagnancy has raised several issues as to the
proper scope of ATS litigation, along with issues that only became
cognizable in our modern era: the impact of ATS litigation on
multinational corporations and the growing need for adjudication of
human rights violations.203 Until the ATS is definitively contained or
fully expanded, human rights victims will continue to find novel
arguments to employ the ATS,204 and multinational corporations will
endeavor to shield themselves from litigation by arguing for Justice
Scalia’s strict interpretation of the statute.205 So long as the door to the
ATS remains even slightly ajar, numerous attempts to establish
jurisdiction in federal courts under the ATS can be expected, as well as
great opposition seeking to firmly shut the door to modern ATS claims.
Carolyn A. D’Amore

situations and prides itself in resolving various disputes.
203. See generally supra notes 175-200 (discussing the modern issues attached to the ATS).
204. See supra notes 176-182 and accompanying text (proposing the ways in which human
rights litigation will employ the ATS to correct violations around the world).
205. See supra notes 183-189 and accompanying text (suggesting the resistance of U.S.
corporations to litigation under the ATS).
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